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"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus  shall  not be  sus-
pended,  unless  when in  Cases  of Rebellion  or Invasion  the public
Safety  may require it." '
INTRODUCTION
The  Suspension  Clause,  as  the  quoted  language  is generally  de-
scribed, is  as straightforward  as  an English sentence  can be.  And to
those familiar with  the Great Writ,2 its meaning, at least at first read-
ing, does not seem  obscure.
Yet few clauses  in the Constitution have proved so  elusive.  Schol-
ars have  debated  a remarkable  range of questions about its meaning
ever since its inclusion in  the text submitted  to the  states for ratifica-
@  2006  David L.  Shapiro.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions  may reproduce
and  distribute  copies  of this Article  in  any format, at or below  cost, for educational
purposes, so long  as each  copy identifies the author, provides a citation  to the  Notre
Dame Law Review,  and includes  this provision  and copyright notice.
*  William  Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Emeritus,  Harvard  University.  My
deepest  thanks  to  Bruce  Hay,  Dan  Meltzer,  and  Amanda  Tyler  for  their insightful
comments  and  suggestions on earlier  drafts.
I  U.S.  CONST.  art. I, § 9,  cl. 2.
2  The writ  of habeas  corpus has  many varieties  and purposes, all  involving  the
literal  (or, later on,  figurative)  production  of a detainee before the court, and some
forms of the writ have developed more recently than others.  For the range and forms
of its  current use,  see  BLACK'S  LAW  DICTIONARY  728  (8th ed. 2004).  For  informative
histories of the evolution of the writ, see, for example, WILLIAM  F. DUKER, A CONSTITU-
TIONAL  HISTORY  OF  HABEAS CoRPus  (1980);  ROLLIN  C.  HURD,  A  TREATISE  ON  THE
RIGHT  OF  PERSONAL  LIBERTY, AND  ON  THE WRIT OF  HABEAS  CORPUS (Albany, W.C. Little
& Co.  1858);  ROBERT S.  WALKER,  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  AND  LEGAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF
HABEAS  CORPUS  AS  THE WRIT OF  LIBERTY  (1960).
The most significant form of the writ, and the one most relevant  to the meaning
and application  of the Suspension Clause,  has been  known before and since adoption
of the Constitution as the writ of habeas corpus  ad subjiciendum, the form  designed to
test the  lawfulness of the petitioner's detention.  It is the form sometimes referred  to
as "The Great Writ."NOTRE  DAME  LAW  REVIEW
tion, and some of the most difficult of these have yet to be resolved by
the Court that regards  itself as  the final arbiter of constitutional dis-
putes. 3  Any list of the most significant of these questions would surely
include:
0 Does the Clause impose on the federal government not only an
explicit  prohibition  (subject  to explicit exceptions),  but also  an  im-
plicit obligation?
" If it does, what is  the nature of the  obligation?
" Which  branch or branches  of the federal government have au-
thority  to suspend  the writ?4
" What constitutes  a "suspen[sion]"  of the writ?
" Is  the  decision  by an authorized branch  of the government  to
suspend  the  writ  subject  to judicial  review,  and  if  so,  under  what
standard?
e What are the consequences of a valid suspension of the writ?  In
particular,  does  a  suspension  simply  render  unavailable  a particular
remedy,  or does it modify or abrogate  any otherwise  existing rights?
Given the historical and present value of the writ as a safeguard of
individual liberty, every one of these questions can have profound im-
portance,  especially  in a time  of national  crisis,  and each will  be  ad-
dressed,  at  least  briefly,  in this  Article.  Indeed,  to  separate  out  any
one for completely independent  consideration  would challenge  even
the most artful  of lawyers-a  clan that, it is said, possesses  the special
skill of separating  the inseparable.
But my principal  focus will  be  on the  last question-the  conse-
quences of a valid suspension.  This question, in itself, raises challeng-
ing issues about the nature of law and the relation between rights and
remedies-issues  that intrigue  legal theorists at  any time but that, at
3  The debate about the relative roles of the three branches of the federal govern-
ment  in interpreting  the  Constitution  is  a continuing one.  See RICHARD  H.  FALLON,
JR.,  DANIEL  J.  MELTZER  &  DAVID  L.  SHAIRO,  HART  AND  WECHSIFR's  THE  FEDERAL
COURTS  AND  THE FEDERAL  SYSTEM 88-92 (4th ed. 1996).  (Space limitations compelled
the  unfortunate  omission  of this  material  in  the  next  edition.)  But  there  is  little
doubt that the Court today views its role-limited only by the doctrines ofjurisdiction
and justiciability-as that of final arbiter of the meaning and application of the  Con-
stitution.  See,  e.g.,  United States v. Nixon,  418 U.S. 683, 704-05  (1974);  cf. Cooper v.
Aaron,  358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)  (rejecting state officials'  claim that they had no enforcea-
ble duty to comply with federal court orders resting on the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the Constitution).
4  Although lawyers and judges generally speak of suspension of the writ, the text
actually refers to suspension of"Iitlhe  Privilege of the Writ."  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl.
2.  There  may  be  a difference  between  the  two phrases,  but for convenience,  the
shorter form will be  used  here.
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this writing, may  also  affect  the  practice  of law  by criminal  and  civil
rights lawyers,  the  decisions  of judges, and the fates of prisoners.
My  point  of departure,  in  some  respects,  is  a  recent  article  by
Professor Trevor Morrison in which he argues that a valid suspension
serves  only  to  withdraw  from  the  courts  the  power  to  grant habeas
corpus but does not modify or abrogate  any underlying constitutional
(or  other legal)  right.5  My view is  that while  such  a result  is not im-
plausible,  it cannot be squared  with  either  the  essence  of the  Great
Writ or with a proper understanding  of the  Suspension  Clause.
This  conclusion  may jar, or even  offend,  those who would resist
any interpretation  of the Constitution that would appear  to threaten
basic  liberties.  But  I  hope to  convince  at least some  of these  critics
that the interpretation I advocate is fair to the needs of government in
crisis and-if properly  understood  as  a limited authorization  of the
exercise  of extraordinary  power  in  times  of urgent need-is  at  the
same  time  as  protective  of the  rights  of individuals  as  such  a  crisis
reasonably  permits.  Indeed,  adoption  of Morrison's  position  could
nullify, or at least severely undermine, the objective  envisioned by the
granting  of authority to suspend.
I.  PRELIMINARY  ISSUES
Each of the  questions  posed  in  the  Introduction  is worthy  of at
least brief discussion in this Article.  Moreover, some consideration of
each  is  proper,  if not necessary,  to  an  understanding  of the  major
question  under consideration  here.
A.  The  Question of Obligation
Habeas  corpus  is  the  only  common  law  writ  referred  to  in  the
Constitution, and the reference appears only as a conditional prohibi-
tion on the exercise  of federal authority.  In the absence  of a  specific
grant of authority,  then,  can  this  Clause,  or any other clause  of the
Constitution,  be  read  to  mandate  the existence  of authority  to grant
the  writ?  Or does  the  Clause  mean  simply  that the federal  govern-
5  Trevor  W.  Morrison,  Hamdi's  Habeas Puzzle:  Suspension  as Authorization?, 91
CORNELL L. REv. 411,  415  (2006).  Among the many other scholarly discussions of the
Suspension  Clause, perhaps the one that touches most closely  on the central issue  in
this  essay  is James  E. Pfander,  The Limits of Habeas  Jurisdiction and the Global War on
Terror,  91  CORNELL  L.  REV.  497  (2006).  And for insightful  discussion  of a closely  re-
lated problem,  see Eugene  Kontorovich,  The Constitution in Two Dimensions:  A  Transac-
tion  Cost  Analysis  of  Constitutional Remedies,  91  VA.  L.  REv.  1135  (2005);  Eugene
Kontorovich,  Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights:  The  Case of Mass Detentions, 56
STAN.  L. REv.  755  (2004)  [hereinafter Kontorovich,  Liability Rules].62  NOIRE  0  E  W(  REVIEW
ment is barred  (with the  specified exceptions)  from denying the abil-
ity  to grant the writ to  any court  in  the  United  States that has been
given  that authority either by common  or positive  law?  If the latter,
perhaps the Clause simply protects state judiciaries from federal intru-
sion  on  whatever  power  they  may  have  to  entertain  and  to  grant a
habeas petition.
6
Textual support for this view  may be found not only in the lan-
guage  of the  Clause  but in its location-not in  the list of delegated
powers in Section 8 of Article  I, but in a list of prohibitions in Section
9.7  Moreover, the writ is referred  to as a "privilege," not a right.8  And
historical  support for the  narrower  view  may be  garnered  from  the
facts  that an earlier draft did contain an affirmative guarantee  of the
availability of the writ, and that at least some contemporary  observers
apparently  thought  or assumed  that  the  final version  submitted  for
ratification contained  no such guarantee.
9
But the contemporary  history, both during the Convention  and
after, turns out to be more ambiguous,  and  to leave  the  present-day
observer-perhaps  even  a  dyed-in-the-wool  originalist
- uncertain
' I
As for the text, the drafters'  use of the words "habeas corpus"-a term
familiar to all lawyers schooled on a heavy diet of Blackstone'
- could
6  William  Duker devotes most of an entire chapter  (chapter  3, pages  126-80)  to
an argument that the Suspension Clause was intended "only to restrict Congressional
power to suspend state habeas for federal  prisoners."  DUKER,  supra note 2,  at 126;  see
also INS v.  St. Cyr,  533  U.S.  289,  337  (2001)  (Scalia, J.,  dissenting)  (contending  that
the Suspension  Clause  does not guarantee  any content  to, or  even the  existence of,
the writ; rather it limits only the ability of Congress to withhold temporarily whatever
it has already authorized by statute);  Rex A. Collings, Jr.,  Habeas Corpus for Convicts-
Constitutional  Right or Legislative Grace?, 40  CAL.  L. REv.  335,  342  (1952)  (noting con-
temporary criticism of the negative form of the text of the Suspension Clause); Dallin
H.  Oaks,  Habeas Corpus in  the  States-17
7 6-
18 6 5, 32  U.  CI.  L.  REV.  243,  248-49
(1965)  (suggesting  that at the  time  the Suspension  Clause  was drafted, the question
whether  the  Constitution  guaranteed  the  privilege  of the  writ  was  not a  matter  of
concern,  perhaps because  the writ was  then available in  every  state).
7  U.S. CONST.  art. I,  § 9,  cl.  2.
8  Id.
9  See Milton  Cantor, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: Early American Origins  and Develop-
ment,  in  FREEDOM  AND  REFORm  55,  75  (Harold  M.  Hyman  & Leonard W.  Levy  eds.,
1967)  (noting uncertainty about whether the Clause guaranteed  the availability of the
writ  or  simply  assumed  its  existence  at  common  law);  Collings,  supra note  6,  at
340-41.
10  For further discussion  and  references,  see  RIcHARD  H.  FALLON,  JR.,  DANIEL J.
MELTZER  &  DAVID  L.  SH-APIRO,  HART  AND  WECHSLER'S  THE FEDERAL  COURTS  AND  THE
FEDERAL  SYSTEM  1289-93  (5th  ed. 2003)  [hereinafter  HART  & WECHSLER].
11  Blackstone, whose  work is generally  recognized as perhaps the principal  refer-
ence and source  of learning  for lawyers  practicing in  the colonies  and later  in  the
states in the years leading up to and following the adoption of the Constitution,  refers
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well  be  taken  as  an  implicit  recognition  that  this  well-known  and
highly respected writ would of course exist unless the specified condi-
tions  of crisis warranted  its suspension.  And  since at the  time  there
were states whose own constitutions did not guarantee the writ's avail-
ability,' 2  that assumption  could  be  understood  as  carrying  with  it a
federal guarantee.  (The question was  mooted, at least in part, by the
specific grant of authority to  issue the writ in  one of the earliest fed-
eral statutes-the Judiciary Act of 1789.1")
Like many others, I believe that the broader view-that the writ is
in fact guaranteed  by implication  in  the Suspension Clause-is an ap-
propriate  (and, for me,  the  most plausible)  reading  of Chief Justice
Marshall's  somewhat  cryptic  discussion  in Ex  parte Bollman.14  While
stating that the authority of the federal courts to grant the writ is both
created  and defined by the  relevant Act of Congress, he also  makes it
to the writ generally  as "the most celebrated writ in the English  law."  WILLIAM  BLAcK-
STONE,  3 COMMENTARIES  * 129.  He also refers to habeas corpus ad subjiciendum as "the
great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement."  Id. at *131.  He goes
on  to extol the significance of the writ in maintaining "the glory of the English law,"
id. at *133,  by requiring the custodian to express "upon every commitment the reason
for which  it  is made,  that the court, upon a  habeas corpus, may examine into its valid-
ity,"  id. at * 134.
12  Indeed,  although  the writ was  known  and  available  in  at least some  form  in
every  original  state,  see DUKER,  supra note  2, at  116,  a  significant  majority  of those
states did not guarantee the availability of the writ in their own constitutions,  see Oaks,
supra note 6, at 247.
13  Section  14 of the judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,  1 Stat. 73, 81-82, provided  that
the courts of the United States
shall have  power  to issue writs of scirefacias, habeas corpus ...  and  all  other
writs  not specially provided  for by  statute,  which  may  be  necessary  for, the
exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable  to the principles and
usages of law.  And  ...  either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as
judges of the district courts, shall have power  to grant writs of habeas corpus
for  the purpose of an  inquiry into  the cause  of commitment.
In Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S.  (4 Cranch)  75  (1807),  the Court read these provisions
as  authorizing not only  issuance  of the writ  as  auxiliary  to jurisdiction  already con-
ferred  but also  as  authorizing  an  independent  action  in  habeas  corpus;  the  power
expressly conferred on  individual justices  and judges by the second quoted sentence
was held  to  be  implicitly vested  in  the courts.  Id. at 95-96;  see HART  & WECHSLER,
supra note  10, at 1286.
14  8 U.S.  (4 Cranch)  75,  95 (1807).  The issue discussed  in  this paragraph of text
divided the Court in INS v.  St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 291-92  (2001).  After concluding, in
dictum,  that the Suspension  Clause at a minimum protected  the writ as it existed in
1789, the majority viewed the language of the Court in  Bollman as consistent with this
protection.  See  id. at  304  n.24.  justice  Scalia,  speaking  for  himself and  two  other
Justices  on this point, argued that under  Bollman, the Suspension  Clause conferred  no
inherent  power to grant the writ.  See id. at 339-41  (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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clear  that, in his  (the Court's)  view,  the Suspension  Clause  imposed
on Congress an obligation to confer habeas corpus jurisdiction on the
judiciary.15  These two notions are not inconsistent: after all, the Con-
stitution explicitly mandates the existence  of a Supreme  Court, but it
is difficult to see how a resistant Congress could have been compelled
by some  external authority to create it. 16 And at the same  time, Mar-
shall's view does not have to be understood to require  the creation of
a judicial  system  capable  of entertaining  petitions  for  the  writ,  for
Congress could  surely have vested  that power  in the state  courts.1
7
Another  argument for the existence  of an affirmative guarantee:
the habeas corpus remedy  is essential  to the full realization  of certain
other guarantees,  most particularly that of due  process  of law in  the
Fifth  Amendment.  True, the  Bill of Rights  followed ratification,  but
there  was  a  widespread  understanding  that it would follow, and  the
development  of the writ in England was  closely linked with  the need
to make effective the guarantees of the Magna Carta, especially that of
due process of law.18  Indeed, the notion that a remedy of this kind is
15  Bolman, 8  U.S.  (4  Cranch)  at 95.  Chief Justice  Marshall's  precise  language,
admittedly  subject to  a range  of interpretations,  was:
Acting  under the  immediate  influence  of this  injunction  [the  Suspension
Clause],  they  [Congress]  must have  felt, with  peculiar  force, the obligation
of  providing  efficient  means  by  which  this  great  constitutional  privilege
should  receive  life  and  activity;  for  if the means  be  not in  existence,  the
privilege  itself would be lost, although no  law for its suspension  should be
enacted.  Under the impression of this obligation, they give,  to all courts, the
power of awarding writs  of habeas corpus.
Id.
16  Of course, the obligation here could have  been regarded as self-executing,  and
some day that issue may  have  to be  squarely  faced.  But so far, it has not.
17  The word  "surely" is often used, as here, to indicate  that the author's certainty
is  not universally shared.  Indeed,  a number  of Supreme  Court decisions,  including
Ableman v.  Booth,  62  U.S.  (21  How.)  506,  526  (1859),  and  Tarb/e's Case, 80 U.S.  (13
Wall.)  397, 411-12  (1872),  can be  read as holding that the states are constitutionally
precluded  from granting a writ of habeas corpus  ad subjiciendum to a petitioner held
in federal custody.  But they can also be read as simply asserting  (implied)  exclusive
federal jurisdiction  to grant such a writ, and if read more broadly, may well run afoul
of basic  concepts  of the  role of the  state courts  in enforcing  federal,  and especially
constitutional,  rights.  See HART  &  WECHSLER,  supra note  10,  at 437-39.
18  As noted  by Walker, during  the sixteenth and seventeenth  centuries:
[T] he Charter  [Magna Carta] and the writ of habeas corpus became  inextri-
cably  intertwined  ....  In the battle against royal despotism the Charter was
adduced as evidence of the illegality of arbitrary executive  commitments and
the writ of habeas  corpus was  seized  upon  as  the most  likely instrument  by
which  such commitments could be subjected to due process.  The result was
the clear emergence of the Charter as the touchstone of the subject's liberty
and the habeas  corpus as the instrumental  guarantee  of his  right.
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essential  to the realization  of the  due  process  rights  of those in  cus-
tody might well support the conclusion  that, had there  been no Sus-
pension Clause, such  a  remedy  would still be implicitly mandated  by
the Constitution.
At any rate, I happily join the judges and commentators who draw
on text, history, context, and policy to conclude  that our Federal Con-
stitution  provides more than  a limitation on federal  power to suspend
the writ-that it embodies a guarantee of its availability in the absence
of the conditions  allowing that limitation to  be  put into  effect.' 9  In-
deed, as I will try to explain later, this conclusion  lends support to my
view  of the effect  of a valid  suspension  on the  scope  of underlying
individual  rights.
B.  The Nature of the Obligation
Not  surprisingly, crossing  one threshold brings  us  to another-
one I describe  here  as  the  nature  of the obligation  that  is  imposed.
Once  again,  the  text is  far from definitive,  since  it refers  to "Habeas
Corpus" but makes no effort to define  the term.
2 0
At the very least, the term  appears to carry with  it whatever com-
prised  the general understanding  of the writ at the time  the Suspen-
sion  Clause  was adopted.  And  that understanding  was  informed  by
the  writings  of Blackstone, 21 use  of the  writ  in  this  country, 22  and
whatever  knowledge  may have  existed of the many English  cases  ex-
ploring the  scope of the writ  over the preceding  centuries.23
WALKER,  supra note  2, at 88;  see also BLACKSTONE,  supra note  11,  at *133-34 (linking
the guarantees  of Magna  Carta  and the role  of the writ of habeas corpus).
19  Professor Freedman reached a similar conclusion  (though differently phrased)
after examination of the records of the Constitutional Convention and of the ratifica-
tion debates: "[The  records suggest]  that all parties read it [the Suspension Clause]  as
protecting broadly against Congressional interference with the power that federal and
state  courts  were  each assumed  to  possess:  to  order the  release  on  habeas corpus of
both federal and state prisoners."  Eric M. Freedman,  The Suspension Clause in the Rati-
fication Debates, 44 BuFF.  L.  RE'.  451,  468  (1996).
20  US.  CONST.  art. I,  § 9,  cl.  2.
21  See supra note 11.
22  See generally DuKER,  supra note  2,  at 95-116  (describing the extension  of the
writ in the  British  colonies in North America).
23  See generally William F. Duker,  The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A
Peculiar Path to  Fame, 53  N.Y.U.  L.  REv.  983  (1978)  (arguing  that  the  "Great Writ"
developed  over  time  into an  instrument protecting personal  liberty,  but began  as  a
means of facilitating  a monarchical judicial process).
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One major difficulty  is that, as  even Blackstone acknowledged
2 4
the story of the writ's development  has not been one of either trans-
parency  or  unimpeded  progress.  And  as  American  courts  often
noted, the history of the writ has always  been marked by a considera-
ble  degree  of  discretion.
25  Moreover,  the writ  has  served  different
purposes at different times.  Sometimes, it has been a device for assert-
ing jurisdictional primacy over a competing court.
26  Sometimes it has
been  the principal  technique  by which  the  common-law  courts  con-
tested the  power of the Crown and sometimes it has given way before
the insistence of the executive on exclusive authority to determine the
basis,  duration,  and nature  of detention.
27  Indeed,  on  several  occa-
sions,  Parliament  saw fit, either by  resolution
2 s  or by statute,
29  to re-
mind  the  courts  and  the  Crown  of  the  importance  of the  writ  in
confining detentions  to occasions duly authorized  by existing law.
The core of the  Great Writ (habeas  corpus  ad subjiciendum), how-
ever,  can fairly be summarized  throughout  this period as  the vehicle
24  Blackstone  noted  that legislative  action had on occasion  been required-as  a
result of various  "evasions" and "abuses" by some  English  courts.  BLACKSTONE,  supra
note  11,  at "134-35.  And Cantor referred  not only to the writ's "dark and hazy past"
and its development in the United Kingdom through "trial-and-error usage, and com-
promise arrangements," Cantor, supra note 9, at 58, but also to the frequent denial of
relief in  the American  colonies when  habeas was sought to curb the exercise  of arbi-
trary  power,  id. at  60-73.  But  he  concludes  that by  the  late  eighteenth  century,
"habeas corpus was deeply embedded in the interstices  of colonial thought, much like
the common law  itself."  Id. at 73.
25  E.g., In re Lincoln,  202 U.S.  178,  180  (1906);  Ex parteRoyall, 117 U.S.  241,  251
(1886);  Ex parte Siebold,  100  U.S. 371,  375  (1880).
26  DUKER,  supra note  2, at 27-33.
27  For an informative discussion  of the role of habeas corpus  in delineating exec-
utive  authority during the sixteenth  and seventeenth  centuries,  see  id.,  at 40-48.
28  The Petition of Right,  1627,  3 Car. 1, c. 1 (Eng.),  noted in WALKER,  supra  note
2,  at 66-70, was essentially supplicatory, and fell short of its goal, at least at the outset.
29  Act of 1679,  31 Car. 2,  c.  2  (Eng.).  Though  frequently referred to by historians
as one of the most famous and important statutes in the annals of English law,  see, e.g.,
DUKER,  supra note 2, at 52, Henry Hallam  notes that the Act introduced no principle
and conferred  no new  rights,  HENRY  HALLAM,  THE CONSTITUTIONAL  HISTORY  OF EN-
CLAND  430-31  (William Smith ed.,  9th ed.  1905).  Rather  it sought to remedy several
abuses that had developed, for example, by authorizing individual judges to grant the
writ during  the vacation  and  by extending  the  geographical  reach  of  the writ  (to
thwart efforts  to  move  the prisoner outside  the court's jurisdiction).  Id. at 431-32.
But it did  not empower  courts to inquire  into the  validity of facts alleged  in  the war-
rant ordering  the detention, and extended only limited guarantees  (requiring that if
an  indictment  was  not filed  within  a  certain  period,  the  petitioner  had  a  right  to
release on bail) in cases of commitment for treason  or felony.  Id. at 432.  To a signifi-
cant extent, then, petitioners, even after enactment of the  1679 Act, were thrown back
on  the habeas  remedy as it had existed, and continued  to exist, at common  law.  Id.
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for determining the lawfulness of confinement-a writ directed to the
custodian  to  produce  the prisoner, together  with  a statement  of the
cause of his detentio
n . 3 °  And if the statement did not satisfy the court
of the lawfulness of the custody, the remedy was discharge  (or release
on the giving of surety, if that was  appropriate)."
But  to  state  the  core  is,  in turn,  to  raise  a  host of questions.
32
What was  the territorial  reach  of the  court to which  the prisoner  ap-
plied for relief?  When the detention was not pursuant to the order of
a court but solely on command  of the  executive  (often the Crown),
were  there  situations  in which the executive  did  not have  to supply
any  explanation  beyond  the vaguest statement that  the prisoner  was
detained pursuant to executive command?  And when a more inform-
ative reason was required, to what extent could the court entertaining
the  petition  inquire  into the  validity  of  the reason  given,  especially
when it raised a question of fact?  As to detentions pursuant to judicial
order,  how  relevant  to  the  court's  power  was  the  character  of  the
court  that  issued  the  detention  order  (e.g.,  was  it "inferior"  in  the
sense  that unlike courts of general jurisdiction, it was not necessarily a
court of record and its authority  extended  only to limited  categories
of cases)?  And what was  the appropriate  scope  of the writ when  the
detention  was  not based  solely on a  charge  of wrongdoing but on a
trial  and conviction?  Was  the  only question  in  that context whether
the convicting court had "jurisdiction" to  try the  case,  and if so, how
was  this chameleon-like  term  to be defined?
33
30  See HART  &  WECHSLER,  supra note  10,  at 1284.
31  Id. at  1284-85.
32  Many of the questions  raised  in this  paragraph  are  explored  in the following
historical  studies:  DUKER,  supra note  2;  HALLAm,  supra note  29;  HURD,  supra note  2;
WALKER,  supra note 2;  Cantor,  supra note  9;  Oaks,  supra note 6.  For further discus-
sion and debate of some of these questions, see, for example, EdwardJenks,  The Story
of the Habeas Corpus, 18 LAw Q. Rv. 64 (1902);  Dallin H.  Oaks, Legal History in the High
Court-Habeas Corpus, 64  MICH.  L.  REv.  451  (1966);  Ann Woolhandler,  Demodeling
Habeas, 45  STAN.  L.  REV.  575  (1993).
33  A case  sometimes relied  on by judges and commentators  to show  that the in-
quiry  on  a habeas  petition did  not stop at the question  of "jurisdiction" is  Bushel's
Case, 124 Eng.  Rep.  1006  (C.P.  1670)  (use  of the  writ in this  famous case  has been
regarded as establishing that jurors could not be imprisoned  for bringing in a verdict
believed by the court to be unacceptable).  But as one scholar has noted, Bushell's Case
involved  an attack on the judgment  not of a court of general jurisdiction  but of an
"inferior" court  (i.e.,  one  not having general jurisdiction  to try offenses).  See DUKER,
supra  note 2, at 227.  Such courts stood on a different footing when  their actions were
challenged  by a habeas petition in  a "superior" court.  Id. at 226-27; Oaks,  supra note
32, at 462-67  (noting five other special factors relating to Bushell's Case that have been
overlooked  by those seeking  to rely  on  it).NOTRE  DAME  LAW  REVIEW
Given  the difficulty of taking a readily perceptible snapshot of the
writ  as  it existed  at the  time of ratification,  especially  in  light of the
range  of state law understandings  then in effect,34 even  a  committed
originalist would find  the  task of defining  the  exact contours  of the
constitutional  guarantee  a daunting one.  But one who is not a strict
originalist must also  ask  whether, and  to  what extent, developments
since ratification  have  affected the scope of the guarantee.  These de-
velopments  include  such  changes  (brought  on  by  constitutional
amendment, statute,  and judicial  development)  as:  (1)  expansion  in
the notion of "custody" entitling a petitioner to seek relief;35  (2)  elimi-
nation  of the need to produce  the  body of the prisoner  in order  to
inquire into  the lawfulness  of custody;3 6  (3)  expansion  and ultimate
abandonment of the concept  of 'jurisdiction"  as  the key question  in
determining  the lawfulness of custody pursuant to  a judgment of con-
viction;3 7  (4) expansion of the scope of the remedy, to the point that
an order of release could be conditioned on such matters as failure to
improve  the conditions of detention or failure to accord  the prisoner
a  new  trial;3 a  and  (5)  dilution  of the distinction  among the various
34  See DuER,  supra note 2,  at 95-116 (noting that by the time of ratification  the
writ was  recognized  in all the states and documenting the range  of use and recogni-
tion of the writ in  the states and  the predecessor colonies).
35  See HART  & WECHSLER,  supra note 10, at 1395-99  (citing additional supporting
authorities).  Among the most significant cases are Jones v.  Cunningham,  371  U.S.  236,
242-43  (1963),  which held that one is still  in "custody" while on parole, and Carafas  v.
LaVallee, 391  U.S.  234,  237  (1968),  which held that the  petitioner's unconstitutional
release  did not moot a case  in  which  the habeas petition had been  filed during the
period of the petitioner's imprisonment.
36  See Gerald  L. Neuman,  The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS  v. St. Cyr,
33  COLUM,  HuM.  RTs.  L. REV.  555,  592  (2002).
37  In the view  of some, "jurisdiction" was  never the  definitive  test in  the federal
courts for the validity of detention, even detention pursuant to ajudgment of convic-
tion.  See, e.g.,  Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal  Habeas Corpus  Relitigation, 16 HARV.  C.R.-
C.L. L. REv.  579,  603-63  (1982).  In the view of others, 'jurisdiction"  was relevant in
certain types  of cases, but the definition of the term was gradually  enlarged  until, in
decisions  leading  up to and  culminating  in  Brown  v.  Allen,  344  U.S.  443  (1953),  it
became irrelevant, even in the context of a federal collateral attack  on a state convic-
tion.  See, e.g.,  Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal  Law and Federal  Habeas Corpus  for State
Prisoners,  76 HARV.  L. REv. 441,  483-500  (1963).  See generally HART & WECHSLER,  supra
note  10,  at 1314-17  (contrasting differing historical views  of jurisdiction  and habeas
corpus).
38  Indeed,  in  Peyton v.  Rowe,  391  U.S.  54,  55  (1968),  the  Court, overruling  an
earlier decision,  held that a habeas petitioner could challenge the validity of the sec-
ond of two  consecutive sentences while  still serving  the first.
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types  of  tribunals  or  other  authorities  that  had  ordered  the
detention.3 9
At the same  time, recent decades  have  seen a rolling back of the
scope of protection  afforded  by the writ, especially  (but by no means
exclusively)  as it relates to the availability of a federal remedy for state
prisoners.40  To what extent this erosion  may lie within the discretion
of the  legislative  and judicial  branches  depends  in part  on whether
the  boundaries  of the  constitutional  guarantee  have  expanded  over
the  preceding century and  a half.
The Justices of the Supreme  Court have had occasion  to express
some views  on these issues as recently as 2001,  in  INS v.  St. Cyr. 4 1  Jus-
tice  Scalia,  for three Justices,  argued  that  the  Constitution  did  not
guarantee any content to, or even the  existence of, the writ.4 2  Justice
Stevens,  for  the  majority,  took  a  diametrically  opposite  position  in
what may be only dictum, but is written in the strongest of terms.43  At
39  The former distinction between  "inferior" courts  (i.e.,  courts that had limited
jurisdiction and that might not be courts of record) and courts of general jurisdiction,
discussed,  inter alia, by Woolhandler, has ceased to be important, but the distinction
between detention pursuant to court order and detention solely on the basis of execu-
tive  decision remains significant.  Woolhandler,  supra  note 32, at 589-90; see,  e.g., INS
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.  289, 301  (2001); Gerald  L. Neuman,  Habeas Corpus, Executive Deten-
tion, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM.  L.  REv. 961  (1998).
40  The retreat from  the extensions  of the writ during  the Warren  Court era fo-
cused  primarily  on  its use  by state  prisoners complaining  that  their  convictions  vio-
lated their federal constitutional rights.  Starting with  such decisions  as Stone v. Powell,
428  U.S. 465  (1976),  Wainwright v.  Sykes, 433 U.S.  72  (1977),  and  Teague v.  Lane, 489
U.S.  288 (1989),  the retreat was  given further momentum  by Congress  in the Antiter-
rorism  and  Effective Death  Penalty  Act of 1996  (AEDPA),  Pub. L.  No.  104-132,  110
Stat. 1214 (codified  as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18,  22, 28,  40, & 42 U.S.C.),
which  contains a  number of provisions restricting the writ's availability, perhaps most
notably the section,  codified in 28  U.S.C. § 2254(d)  (2000),  requiring  increased def-
erence to the factual and legal determinations of the state courts.  See generally HART &
WECHSLER,  supra note  10,  at 1296-1399  (tracing  the  availability  of federal  review  of
state court convictions from the antebellum era through the passage of the AEDPA in
1996 and  its aftermath).
41  533 U.S. 289  (2001).
42  Id. at 337  (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43  Id. at 300-01  (majority  opinion).  One of the questions before the Court was
whether, in imposing  restrictions on judicial review  in certain  statutory amendments
to the immigration  laws, Congress had limited the jurisdiction of the federal courts  to
entertain habeas  corpus petitions, under 28 U.S.C.  § 2241,  raising legal challenges  to
petitioner's detention.  St.  Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298.  The Court held that it had not, and in
doing so, relied on  the presumption in  favor of judicial review, as well  as on the sub-
stantial  constitutional  questions  that, in its view, would  be presented  under the Sus-
pension Clause if habeas corpus  relief, as well  as adequate  alternative remedies,  were
unavailable.  Id. at 298-314.
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its core  (and as "the absolute minimum"), 44 he said, "the Suspension
Clause protects the writ 'as  it existed in 1789,' "4 and in the context of
executive detention, where  its protection  is strongest, it embraces the
legality (i.e.,  lawfulness, whether grounded in the Constitution or not)
of the  detention.
46
To explore the other side of this coin-the question of determin-
ing what  limitations  on  the  availability  of the writ would  violate  the
constitutional  guarantee-requires  further  elaboration.  But  there  is
an important question that needs  to be addressed  prior to that elabo-
ration  (in Part I.C,  below):  where does  the authority rest  to suspend
the writ when and if the conditions for suspension are met?
C.  The Locus of Authority to Suspend the Writ
Assuming,  then, some consensus on-or at least willingness to as-
sume  for purposes  of further  discussion-the  basic  contours  of the
constitutional guarantee,  a natural follow-up  question  is whether  the
authority to  suspend the writ is limited to  any branch  or  branches of
the federal  government.
The federal  government  has  (at least)  three  branches  (four, by
some counts),  and one of those  is the judicial.  And  an early draft  of
the  Suspension  Clause appeared  in what  became  Article  1II.47 Yet I
have seen no argument that the writ may be suspended by the judicial
branch acting  on its own.  Is the suggestion  wholly implausible?
Perhaps so, since it is hard to imagine  a petition being dismissed
because  a rebellion  or invasion justifies  suspension  unless the custo-
dian  asks  for dismissal  on  that ground.  Theoretically,  perhaps,  one
can imagine a situation in which  the executive branch  is so (tempora-
rily?)  incapacitated  that it is unable  to respond  to a petition.  But the
breakdown  of civil authority  in such a situation would probably be  so
complete  that a functioning judiciary  is difficult to  envision.  Moreo-
ver, the Clause  did not remain in the Article establishing  the judicial
branch, but ended up in Article  I, dealing principally with the author-
ity of the legislative branch.
Realistically,  then, the question  is whether the authority  is vested
in either or both the legislative  and executive  branches.  Though our
history includes very few executive  efforts  to suspend the writ without
44  St.  Cyr,  533 U.S.  at 300-01.
45  Id. (quoting Felker v. Turpin,  518  U.S. 651,  663-64  (1996)).
46  Id. at 301  (citing Swain v.  Pressley, 430 U.S.  372,  380 n.13  (1977)).  The Court
relied on a similar statement (also dictum)  in  Felker. 518 U.S. at 663-64.
47  See 2 TiE  RECORDS  OF THE FEDERAL  CONVENTION  OF  1787, at 435  (Max Farrand
ed., 1966)  [hereinafter  RECORDS  OF THlE  FEDERAL  CONVENTION].
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legislative  authorization,4 8  the arguments  that the power  to  authorize
suspension  is  vested  exclusively  in  the legislature  are powerful,  and,
for me,  convincing.
49
First, under the English tradition from which we  derived our un-
derstanding of the writ, suspension was, at least as a matter of practice,
the exclusive  prerogative of Parliament-a prerogative exercised on a
number of occasions.50  Second, the Suspension  Clause, as noted, ap-
pears in Article I, the article dealing with the powers  of Congress, and
to the  extent it contains an explicit authorization,  the inference  that
the  power  to  authorize  belongs  to  the  legislature  seems  a  natural
one.51  And finally, though there is no square Supreme Court holding,
several Justices have endorsed the view that the authority to suspend  is
48  President  Lincoln  ordered  suspension  of the writ during  the  Civil War  (and
prior  to legislative  authorization  of suspension),  an  action  that Chief Justice  Taney
held unconstitutional  in Ex parte Menyman, 17 F.  Cas. 144,  151-53 (C.C.D.  Md. 1861)
(No. 9487).  (There is debate  over whether  the petition in  Merryman was  directed  to
Taney  in his capacity  as a circuit justice  or as Chief Justice.  See Michael  Stokes Paul-
sen,  The Merryman  Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation,
15 CARDOZO  L. RE\,.  81,  90  n.27  (1993)).
In  addition,  the  writ was suspended  (without legislative authorization)  by  (then
General)  Andrew Jackson  as commander  at  New  Orleans.  See  DANIEL  FARBER,  LIN-
COLN'S  CONSTITUTION  160  (2003);  Morrison,  supra note  5, at 428, 429 & n.102.  (Also,
President Andrew Johnson reportedly suspended the writ for one of the conspirators
involved  in  Lincoln's  assassination.  See WILLIAM  H.  REHNQUIST,  ALL  THE  LAWS  BUT
ONE  165  (1998)).  See generally Tor Ekeland, Note, Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article I,
Section 9, Clause 2 of the  United States Constitution and the War on  Terror,  74 FORDHAM  L.
REv.  1475,  1487-88  (2005).
49  See generallyJeffrey D. Jackson,  The Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus: An Answer
from the Arguments SurroundingEx  parte  Merryman,  34 U. BALT.  L. REV.  11  (2004)  (pro-
viding perhaps the  most exhaustive  discussion  of this question).
50  Parliament  effectively suspended the writ a number of times during the  seven-
teenth  and eighteenth  centuries.  See Collings,  supra note  6,  at  339-40  (listing  in-
stances  and collecting  citations).
51  To be sure, Section  9, the provision  of Article  I where  the Suspension  Clause
appears,  contains  some prohibitions  applicable  to the  Executive  (e.g.,  bans  on  the
granting of titles of nobility, U.S. CONST.  art. I,  § 9, cl. 8, and on the acceptance of any
gift from  a foreign state  without the consent of Congress,  id.).  But the wording  in
these instances  leaves no doubt of their scope.  Moreover, these  prohibitions do  not
contain  exceptions  authorizing  actions in  the absence of legislative  authorization  or
approval.
Also, the first version of the Suspension  Clause explicitly stated that the privileges
and benefit  of habeas  corpus  "shall not be suspended  by  the Legislature except upon
the most  urgent and  pressing  occasions, and for  a limited  time not exceeding
months."  RECORDS  Or  THE  FEDERAL  CONWENTION,  supra note  47,  at 334  (emphasis
added).  But after  a later version appeared  in  the judiciary article,  see id. at 341,  the
final version  came  to rest in Article  I.
For a fuller discussion  of this evolution,  see Ekeland,  supra note 48,  at 1484-86.
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delegated  only to  Congress.52  To  my knowledge,  no Justice  has  ex-
pressed disagreement  with that view.
There  is at least one question raised  by this conclusion,  though.
What if, in a  clear emergency,  Congress  cannot act quickly enough?
(Suppose,  for example,  that it must  first be  called  into  session,  and
then some member stalls efforts  to circumvent  the ordinarily cumber-
some legislative process.)  Should  the courts recognize at least a tem-
porary power, residing in the Executive,  to deal with such emergency
situations?
Necessity may well demand the existence of such authority, and I
assume that the Executive,  in  dire circumstances,  would in any event
run the  risk of eventual  rejection of any emergency  power.  But with
this limited  qualification,  the  historical,  textual,  and structural  argu-
ments for exclusive  legislative authority are, in my view, convincing.5 3
D.  When  Does a Limitation on the Availability of the Writ Violate
the Guarantee?
5 4
We  have  traveled  far  enough  to  conclude  (or  for  skeptics-I
hope-to assume)  that the  Suspension  Clause, perhaps  coupled with
other provisions, especially the guarantee  of due process, imposes  an
52  Most  notably, Chief Justice Taney in  Ex parte Merryman, 17  F.  Cas.  at 151-52.
This view was  also  expressed  by  Chief Justice  Marshall  in  Ex parte Bollman, 8  U.S.  (4
Cranch)  75,  101  (1807),  and Justice  Scalia,  whose  dissenting opinion  in  Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542  U.S. 507  (2004),  noted with approval the general assumption  that only
Congress  may authorize suspension  of the writ,  id. at 562  (Scalia, J.,  dissenting).
53  See Ekeland,  supra note  48,  at  1517  (suggesting  that this  conclusion  can  be
squared  with  the argument  that  an  emergency  could  require  immediate  executive
action when, say, Congress  is not in session on the ground that "[t]he President could
hold a detainee until Congress reconvenes and decides whether habeas corpus should
be suspended").  In any event, I have little doubt that the Executive would act in  this
situation, and that Congress would later seek to ratify his action.  Note that Congress's
authorization  of suspension of the  writ, Act of Mar. 3,  1863,  ch.  81,  §  1, 12  Stat. 755,
755,  followed  Lincoln's  initial decision  to suspend  the writ early  in the Civil  War in
Proclamation  No.  1, 13  Stat.  730  (Sept. 24,  1862).
54  Among  the  issues  not explored  in  this  section  are  (a)  whether  and  to what
extent  the guarantee  of the  writ extends  extraterritorially, and  (b)  whether  and to
what extent the guarantee  permits distinctions to be drawn between U.S. citizens and
aliens.  Richard  Fallon and Daniel Meltzer explore  in detail  these and related  issues.
See Richard  H.  Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer,  Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120  HARv.  L. REv.  (forthcoming June  2007).
The  questions  explored  by  Fallon  and  Meltzer  are  especially  critical  in
considering  the validity  of restrictions  on  the availability  of habeas  corpus  to aliens
detained  at Guantanamo  Bay,  Cuba-restrictions imposed  by 28  U.S.C.A.  § 2241 (e)
(West  Supp.  2006)  (see  infra note  69)-and  of  even  broader  restrictions  on  the
availability  of the  writ  to  aliens  detained  as  "enemy  combatant[s]"  that  would  be
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obligation  on  the  federal  government  to  make  the  essence  of the
Great Writ available  in some judicial forum,  and that only  Congress
(in  the  absence  of an  emergency  requiring  interim  action)  can  au-
thorize suspension of this guarantee.  If the conditions warranting sus-
pension  concededly  do  not  exist, what  kinds  of limitations  on  the
availability  of the writ would violate that guarantee?
To begin, if the conclusion  in Part I.C, above,  is sound, virtually
any suspension  of the  guarantee, whether  or not warranted  by inva-
sion or rebellion, would violate the Constitution unless authorized by
Congress.
5 5  (I say  "virtually" because  of the possibility  that  a limited
authority may exist in the Executive  if the emergency  is so immediate
that suspension must be allowed before Congress  can be expected to
act.)
On many occasions, defenders of the writ, and even on some oc-
casions advocates  of its expansion,  have argued, or at least suggested,
that to reject  their contentions  would run afoul  of the constitutional
guarantee.  Such statements, for example  (some more persuasive than
others),  have been made by:  (1) opponents of the legislature's substi-
tution of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for the writ in cases of post-conviction  chal-
lenges by persons  in federal custody;
56 (2)  the Court itself in holding
that an adequate  state ground barring direct review was not necessa-
rily a bar to  collateral habeas  attack  on a state  conviction;
57  (3)  the
Court itself in  holding that Congress  had  not precluded  use of the
writ in its effort to curtail review of certain immigration  matters;
5 8  (4)
a  scholarly  article  contending  that,  in  view  of  the  fundamental
changes wrought by the Fourteenth Amendment, the guarantee man-
dates federal  court authority to  entertain  a habeas petition  by a pris-
oner held pursuant  to  the judgment of a  state court.
59  And on one
occasion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court en route to
a holding that  Congress  could  constitutionally  restrict  the  ability  of
state prisoners  to file  successive petitions in federal court, was willing
imposed  by several  bills  pending at the  time  this Article  went to  press.  See,  e.g.,  S.
3901,  109th  Cong.  § 6 (2006);  S.  3861,  109th Cong. § 5  (2006).
55  See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying  text.
56  See United  States v.  Hayman,  342  U.S. 205,  219  (1952)  (upholding the suffi-
ciency of the statutory procedure).
57  See Fay v. Noia,  372  U.S.  391,  428-34  (1963).
58  See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,  314 (2001).  For a study relied on by the major-
ity in  St.  Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302 n.16,  see Neuman,  supra note  39,  at 990-1004.
59  See Jordan  Steiker,  Incorporating  the Suspension Clause: Is There  a Constitutional
Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?,  92 MICH.  L. REv.  862, 888-99  (1994).
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to  "assume, for purposes  of decision  here,  that  the  . . . Clause  . . .
refers  to the writ as it exists today, rather than as it existed  in 1789."60
Aside from  the unremarkable  inference  that those  arguing for a
particular  result are  prone  to  invoke  the  Constitution  whenever  it is
plausible  to do so, what conclusions is one  to draw about all this, and
more pointedly, about the  proper interpretation of the  constitutional
guarantee?  Surely,  the guarantee  is  not a  one-way  ratchet, in  which
every  advance  in the  availability of the writ becomes  part of the guar-
antee itself.61  (Indeed, such a possibility might serve as a disincentive
to  experimental  expansion  of the  remedy.)  At  the  same  time,  the
guarantee  would  be stripped  of virtually  all meaning  if it did not in-
clude what might fairly be viewed as the essence of the writ at the time
of ratification,  perhaps  defined to  embrace  those clarifications  in  its
scope  that attended  its later development.
Of course, such  a definition  begs  the question  of distinguishing
between  the  area  of "clarification,"  or  molecular  development,  and
that of more radical expansion of the traditional uses of the writ.  But
to  dramatize  the  point, if in recent years,  the courts, with  or without
legislative  direction,  had developed  the  habeas remedy  to the  point
that it had become  a generally available  device for collateral  review of
a criminal conviction, whether or not the petitioner is, or ever was,  in
custody pursuant to the conviction, surely a legislative decision  to roll
back  the  remedy to  situations  involving  present custody,  realistically
defined, would  present no Suspension  Clause problem.
Some particularization  may be useful, even though it leaves open
some difficult issues.  In  my view, as noted above, the heart of the writ
as it existed in  1789  was  its availability  to test the lawfulness  of deten-
tion.62  In  all  instances,  this extended  to a determination of the ade-
quacy of the  custodian's  return,  but "adequacy,"  for example,  might
or might not include  the ability  to test the accuracy of the statements
in  the  return,  and  might or  might not  include  the ability  to  probe
beyond  the  competency  of  the  committing  authority  to  order  the
60  Felker v.  Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,  663-64  (1996).  But he did go on  to say, citing
Bollman, that the authority of a federal court to grant the writ must be given by written
law,  id. at 664; "that judgments about the proper scope of the writ are  'normally  for
Congress  to  make,'"  id.; and that newly  enacted  statutory  restrictions  on  successive
petitions  did  not violate the  Suspension  Clause  because  they were  "well  within  the
compass of this evolutionary  process,"  id. (quoting Lonchar v. Thomas,  517 U.S.  314,
323  (1996)).
61  See St.  Cyr, 533  U.S. at 342  (Scalia, J., dissenting)  (criticizing  the  view that the
Clause is  a  "one-way ratchet that enshrines in the Constitution  every grant of habeas
jurisdiction").
62  See supra note  30 and  accompanying  text.
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commitment.  And I have found little if any indication that the custo-
dian was  required repeatedly  to justify  a  detention  that had already
been unsuccessfully challenged.  But there is no doubt that by the late
eighteenth  and  early nineteenth  centuries,  the test of lawfulness  was
especially  rigorous  when  the committing  authority  was  not a "supe-
rior" court but rather the executive  or an "inferior" court (i.e.,  a court
not necessarily "of record" and not having a broad general jurisdiction
to try offenses) ,63  and particularly when the commitment was not pur-
suant to a trial and conviction  by a "superior" court with competence
to  try the  offense.
64
Turning  to  the  special  features  of the American  federal  system,
one draws little aid from the English experience, but our own history
does cast some light.  It suggests that the guarantee does not mandate
the availability of a federal forum for the filing of a petition by one in
state custody,65  though it may well preclude  federal interference  with
the availability of the writ in state courts, at least in the absence of an
available  federal forum.66  And in  the absence  of a federal forum,  it
may also mandate the availability of a state forum for the bringing of a
petition (on grounds previously unavailable)  when the claim of unlaw-
ful  custody  is  based  on federal  law.67  But this  last question  is  made
63  See,  e.g.,  Neuman,  supra note 39,  at 982-83;  Woolhandler,  supra note  32,  at
589-90  (discussing the status and nature of "inferior" courts);  see  also Neuman, supra
note  39,  at  1020-59  (discussing  the use  of the  writ to  test the  validity of executive
detentions).
64  See HART  & WECHSLER,  supra note  10,  at 1290  (noting the difference  between
cases where the committing authority was a court of general criminal jurisdiction and
those where detention  was not authorized by any court).
65  A proviso to  § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.  20, 1 Stat.  73, 81-82,  stated
that the  writ "shall  in  no  case  extend to  prisoners in  gaol,  unless where  they are  in
custody, under  or by colour of the authority of the United  States, or are  committed
for trial  before  some  court  of the  same."  Specific  exceptions  to  this  proviso  were
enacted before the Civil War, but expansion  of the writ to encompass  generally pris-
oners in state custody did not occur until  1867.  Act of Feb. 5,  1867,  ch. 27,  14 Stat.
385,  385.  But see Steiker,  supra note 59,  at 888-99  (contending that the  effect of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to make the  constitutional  privilege of the writ applica-
ble to those  in state custody).  Even  if accepted, this argument  may not guarantee  a
petitioner  access to a federal court.  See HART & WECHSLER,  supra note  10, at 1292.
66  See  supra note  6  and accompanying  text.  The  possible  conflict between  this
proposition  and  the result in  such  decisions  as  Tarble's Case, 80  U.S.  (13  Wall.)  397
(1872),  is discussed  supra note  17.
67  The question of a state's obligation to afford some sort of post-conviction  pro-
cess,  other than  direct review  (when  direct review  was for  some reason  not an ade-
quate  alternative  with  respect  to  a particular federal  claim),  was  presented but not
decided  in  Case v.  Nebraska, 381  U.S.  336,  337  (1965).  The  question  was  posed  in
terms  not of the  reach  of the  Suspension  Clause,  but  of the  requirements  of due
process.  Id.  But as noted above at supra text accompanying note  18, the habeas rem-
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murkier  by the many unresolved  issues  involving the extent to which
federal  law  may  "commandeer"  the  state  courts  in  situations  where
those  courts  are not discriminating against federal claims.6 8
Finally,  precedent supports  the common  sense  proposition  that
the substitution of a reasonable alternative  remedy for the  traditional
writ does not constitute an  invalid suspension,  though  of course  the
question whether the available alternative is a sufficient one is not sub-
ject to a simple  litmus test.69  And an alternative remedy may well in-
clude  one not available  until a later date,  especially if the only harm
claimed  in  the  interim  is  the  necessity  of undergoing  proceedings
before  a competent  tribunal.70
edy  (or an adequate  alternative)  and the  right of a  detainee  not to be  deprived  of
liberty without due  process are  intertwined.
68  For the possible  impact of such "anti-commandeering" decisions as New  York  v.
United States, 505 U.S.  144  (1992),  and Printz v. United States, 521  U.S. 898  (1997),  on
the question of the extent to which federal constitutional obligations  may be imposed
on  state courts,  see HART  & WECHSLER,  supra note 10,  at 451-53.
69  The Supreme Court has frequently recognized  the authority of a federal court
to grant  a writ  of habeas  corpus  in  a  particular  case  but  has  held  that  petitioner
should  (first, or instead)  be required  to resort  to his remedies on  direct review  (in-
cluding direct review  by the Supreme Court itself).  See, e.g., Tinsley v. Anderson,  171
U.S. 101,  104-05  (1898);  Whitten v. Tomlinson,  160 U.S.  231,  239-42  (1895);  see also
United  States  v.  Hayman,  342  U.S.  205,  214-19  (1952)  (holding  that the  statutory
remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 2255  had not been  shown  to  be an  inadequate  alternative
to a  writ of habeas corpus).
In  the important recent decision  in Hamdan  v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749,  2753-54
(2006)-an action  involving petitions  for mandamus  and habeas  corpus-the Court
held, on certiorari  review, that the  Executive had exceeded  its  authority in establish-
ing  a military commission  to try the petitioner  (an alien  in custody  at Guantanamo
Bay,  Cuba)  for  certain  crimes.  The Court had to deal  at the outset with a statutory
provision,  passed while the  case was pending before  it, providing that "no court...
shall  have jurisdiction  to hear  or consider  ...an application for...  habeas corpus
filed by ...  an alien  detained.  . .at Guantanamo  Bay."  28 U.S.C.A.  § 2241 (e)  (West
Supp.  2006).  The  majority,  avoiding any  constitutional  issues,  held  as  a  matter  of
statutory  construction  that the provision  did  not apply  to  the  case  at bar.  Hamdan,
126 S.  Ct. at 2753-54. Justice  Scalia, joined  by Justices Thomas and Alito in dissent,
argued  that  the  provision  did  apply  but  concluded  that  it presented  no  problem
under the Suspension  Clause both  because  Guantanamo  Bay was "outside  the sover-
eign 'territorial jurisdiction'  of the United States,"  id. at 2818, and because the availa-
bility of direct federal  court review after conviction  (under other provisions  of the
DTA)  constituted  an adequate  substitute for the writ,  id. at 2818-19.
70  See,  e.g.,  Henry v.  Henkel,  235  U.S.  219,  228-29  (1914);  Ex parte Royall,  117
U.S. 241,  250  (1846).  A related  question-whether, in the absence of a valid suspen-
sion,  special conditions  may warrant the  exercise of a court's discretion  to deny  the
writ in favor  of ex post  remedies-is  discussed  by Kontorovich,  Liability Rules, supra
note  5.
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In sum, then, I submit that the case for violation of the guarantee
is strongest when the writ (or an acceptable alternative)  is unavailable
to  challenge  the  lawfulness  of present detention  itself,  and  an  ade-
quate opportunity to challenge that detention in ajudicial forum (not
necessarily a federal  one)  has not previously been afforded.  The case
for violation  of the  guarantee becomes  steadily weaker  as one moves
away from this core-if, for example, the writ is unavailable  when the
petitioner  seeks  to  challenge  not the detention  itself but rather  the
conditions  or other related  aspects  of the  detention,  when  the  peti-
tioner has resorted  to  (or at least was  aware  of and in a  position  to
resort to) earlier opportunities to assert such a challenge in a court of
competent  jurisdiction,71  or  when  the  existence  of  "custody"  is
founded not on some form of imprisonment but rather  on  a signifi-
candy  less onerous restriction  on freedom of movement.
E.  Judicial  Review  of a Decision to Suspend72
Now  suppose  that Congress,  influenced  by  what it regards  as  a
crisis  situation,  enacts a statute announcing  that because of a "rebel-
lion  or  invasion,"  the  privilege  of the  writ  of habeas  corpus  is  sus-
pended in certain designated respects.  This supposition assumes  that
if no claim were or could be made that the textual conditions for sus-
pension existed, the statute would violate the implicit guarantee of the
writ's  availability,  and  that  the  language  of the  statute  satisfies  any
"clear legislative statement" rule73-a  rule that, in my view, should be
a requirement  for such a significant  step.
Judges and commentators have suggested, often with little or no
explanation,  that such  a legislative  determination  is  not  in any way
subject to judicial review.74  Probably the strongest justification would
71  See,  e.g.,  Wainwright  v.  Sykes,  433  U.S.  72,  87  (1977);  Glasgow  v.  Moyer,  225
U.S.  420, 430  (1912).
72  Much of what follows in this brief section  is drawn  from an excellent article by
Professor  Amanda  L.  Tyler,  Is  Suspension  a Political Question?, 59  ST.N  L.  REv.
(forthcoming  Nov.  2006).
73  Seminole  Tribe  v.  Florida,  517  U.S. 44,  55-56  (1996)  (calling it  a rule  that
since  the "Eleventh Amendment  and the  broader  principles  that it reflects" play  an
important constitutional role, "Congress's intent to abrogate  [states'  sovereign immu-
nity] must be  obvious from a 'clear  legislative  statement"'  (quoting Blatchford  v. Na-
tive Vill. of Noatak,  504  U.S.  775,  786  (1991))).
74  See Hamdi  v. Rumsfeld, 542  U.S. 507, 577-78  (2004)  (Scalia, J., dissenting);  id.
at 594 n.4 (Thomas,J., dissenting); Ex pareMerryman,  17 F. Cas. 144,151-52  (C.C.D.
Md.  1861)  (No.  9487)  ("'It would seem,  as the power  is given to  congress to suspend
the  writ of habeas  corpus,  in  cases  of rebellion  or  invasion,  that the  right to judge
whether  the  exigency had arisen must exclusively belong  to that body."'  (quoting  3
JOSEPH  STORY,  COMMENTARIES  ON  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  UNITED STATEf.S  §  1336
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rest on the view that such a judgment is  so political  in nature, and so
related to  the war power and  even to  the country's very survival,  that
judicial  supervision  of Congress's determination  would be wholly out
of order.
75
This justification has considerable  force, and in circumstances  of
perceived  crisis,  may well  carry the day.  But the  Supreme  Court has
never squarely  ruled  on the  issue.  And at least one  scholar  has ex-
plored  the issue  in depth, concluding  that some form  of judicial su-
pervision  is  appropriate. 76  I  will  not  undertake  to  rehearse  her
arguments  in detail here, but only to  note a  few points.  First, some
aspects  affecting the authority to suspend  are undoubtedly subject to
judicial review, for example, whether or not that power is vested exclu-
sively in the legislative branch, 77 whether the branch with authority to
suspend has in fact exercised that authority,78  and whether the  terms
of a suspension  include the  case  at bar.
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Second,  unlike  some  matters  that  have  been  held,  or  at  least
forcefully argued,  to lie beyond the scope of judicial review, the issue
is not one that relates solely to a question of the internal operations of
(Boston, Little Brown  & Co., 3d ed.  1858)));  Exparte  Bollman, 8  U.S.  (4 Cranch)  75,
101  (1807);  3 STORY,  supra,  § 1342.  The language used in some of these references-
about an  authority  that  is vested  exclusively  in  the  legislature-may  have  been  in-
tended  to  say only  that the suspension  power was not vested  in  the  Executive,  and
thus may  not have  been  addressed to  the question  of judicial review.
75  This argument would bring the  issue within the scope of the political question
doctrine.  For a survey and analysis of this doctrine, see HART & WECHSLER,  supra  note
10,  at 244-67.
76  See Tyler,  supra note 72.
77  See Menyman, 17  F.  Cas. at  152.
78  As noted in INS  v. St.  Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,  299  & nn.10-11  (2001),  this issue  is a
strong candidate  for a "clear statement" rule of the kind often imposed by the Court,
especially  when  important  constitutional  interests  are  at stake.  See,  e.g.,  Gregory  v.
Ashcroft, 501  U.S. 452,  460-61  (1991);  Quern  v. Jordan, 440  U.S.  332,  343  (1979).
Significantly,  in  the  recent  decision  in  Hamdan v.  Rumsfeld,  126  S.  Ct.  2749
(2006),  no Justice  on  the Court suggested  that the provision  of a  2005 statute  that
withdrew  habeas  corpus jurisdiction  for  aliens detained  at  Guantanamo  Bay  consti-
tuted an  effort by Congress to exercise  its power under the  Suspension  Clause.  The
majority held that the withdrawal  ofjurisdiction did not apply to the case at bar, id. at
2762-69, and the dissenters argued that the provision presented "no suspension prob-
lem"  for  reasons  stated  supra note  69,  Hamdan,  126  S.  Ct.  at  2818  (Scalia,  J.,
dissenting).
79  The leading example  of such review is the famous decision in  Ex parte Milligan,
71  U.S.  (4 Wall.)  2 (1866),  which is discussed  more fully below, see infra text accompa-
nying  notes  95-100.  See  also Ekeland,  supra note  48, at  1495-96,  1509;  id. at  1496
(noting that the Court in Milligan found that "'suspension  of the privilege of the writ
of  habeas  corpus  does  not  suspend  the  writ  itself"  (quoting  Milligan, 71  U.S.  at
130-31)).
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the  legislative  branch  or  the  processes  of enacting  a bill or constitu-
tional amendment into  law.8 0  Nor does it involve  the kind  of action
that may fall within the courts'  discretion not to adjudicate  because it
affects  all  equally and rather  abstractly.A'  Rather,  it necessarily  and
specifically affects  those particular individuals whose access to the writ
is withdrawn.
Third,  nothing  in  the  text of the  Constitution  manifests  a  "de-
monstrable constitutional  commitment" of all aspects of the decision
to  the  legislative  branch, immune  from judicial oversight.8 2  Indeed,
the text indicates a possible difference between the relatively straight-
forward  question whether there  is  a state of "Rebellion  or Invasion"
and the question whether under such circumstances,  the public safety
"may" require suspension.s   In other words, the text suggests that the
existence of the predicate for suspension  is not a matter committed to
legislative  discretion,  but  that  there  is  broad, perhaps  unreviewable
discretion to  determine whether, if that predicate  is present, the pub-
lic safety requires suspension.8 4
Fourth, the courts may well have authority to determine whether
an  enactment authorizing suspension  involves  an invidious  classifica-
80  On the Court's reluctance to get involved in questions involving the amending
process,  see  Coleman v.  Miller, 307  U.S.  433,  435-56  (1939)  and  id. at 459,  469-70
(Black, J.,  concurring).  For a decision  holding  that the Constitution  leaves  to Con-
gress the determination of how to authenticate that a bill has been passed, see  Field v.
Clark,  143 U.S. 649, 671-73  (1892).  And for a decision  in which the Justices disagreed
on  whether  and  to  what  extent  the  question  of compliance  with  the  Origination
Clause of the Constitution, art. I,  § 7,  cl. I  (requiring revenue bills to originate in the
House  of Representatives),  is  subject  to judicial  review,  see  United States v.  Munoz-
Pores, 495  U.S.  385,  401  (1990)  (Stevens,  J.,  concurring);  id. at  408  (Scalia,  J.,
concurring).
81  Consider, for example,  the Court's treatment of the issue of standing  to sue in
United States v. Richardson, 418  U.S.  166,  176-78  (1974),  and  the discussion  of that
case  in  Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S.  11,  21-23  (1998).
82  The  phrase  "textually  demonstrable  constitutional  commitment"  was  quoted
and used in this context in Nixon v.  United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228  (1993),  which held
nonjusticiable, for this and other reasons, a claim that the Senate  had failed to comply
with the requirements of the Impeachment Clause, art. 1, § 3,  cl. 6.  Nixon, 506 U.S. at
237-38.
83  U.S.  CONST.  art. 1, § 9, cI.  2.
84  Even  if the  question  of suspension  vel  non in  the  face  of an  acknowledged
rebellion or invasion is one vested entirely in the discretion of Congress, there may be
limits on the extent of that discretion on such issues as the scope and duration of the
suspension.  Thus the very word "suspension" suggests limited duration.  And a rebel-
lion  in a particular  locality, such  as  Shays'  Rebellion  in Massachusetts-an  uprising
very  much  in  the  mind  of the  Framers,  see Ekeland,  supra note  48,  at  1483-84  &
nn.63-64-might not warrant a grant of authority to suspend the writ throughout the
country.
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tion  (based, for example, on race,  ethnicity, or religion)  that cannot
be justified on the basis of the particular circumstances warranting  the
suspension.8
Fifth,  the argument that  the matter  is beyond the  scope of judi-
cial  review  because  it is  related  to the  exercise  of the  war  power  is
contradicted  by a host of cases in which  the validity of actions  related
to that power have been considered  by the courts.
8 6
Finally,  to conclude  that  there  is  some room for review is not  to
deny the importance of substantial deference to the legislature's judg-
ment. 8 7  It is one thing to reject, for example, a legislative determina-
tion  (if  one  were  made)  that  the  crossing  of  the  Rio  Grande  by
Mexicans looking for work  is an "invasion" within  the meaning of the
Clause, and another to gainsay the judgment of Congress that an inva-
sion has occurred when an intercontinental  missile attack is launched
against  American  territory,  even if the  missiles  landed  in  the  ocean
short  of their  target.8  But  to  uphold  the  authority  of the  federal
courts to consider both  cases (in an appropriate judicial proceeding)
is to reaffirm the significance ofjudicial review as a basic aspect of our
governmental  structure.
If.  T1E  EFFECT  OF  A VALI  SUSPENSION  ON  UNDERLYING  RIGHTS
With  this background,  let us assume  that Congress has made the
judgment that a suspension of the privilege of the writ is warranted by
a state of rebellion or invasion, and that the judgment is embodied in
a statute  that would be  sustained  on judicial  review.  No  one would
doubt that the effect of the suspension  is,  at a minimum,  to  require
dismissal of a habeas petition if the return establishes that the particu-
lar custody  is within  the scope  of the statute. 8 9  But does  the statute
also modify or even abrogate any underlying substantive constitutional
85  For analogous discussion of "external" restraints  (i.e.,  restraints external to the
provisions of Article  II)  on legislative authority to limit the subject matterjurisdiction
of the federal  courts, see  HART  & WECHSLER,  supra note  10,  at 334-35.
86  For numerous  examples,  see Tyler,  supra note  72.
87  The considerations  relevant  to the difficult question of the standard of review
are discussed  in  detail in  Tyler, supra note  72.
88  For an argument  favoring a temporary and limited suspension  of the writ for
purposes of dealing with  the war on terror, see  Ekeland,  supra note  48,  at 1518.
89  Perhaps  the explanation  lies in the phrasing of the Suspension  Clause when  it
speaks of "[t] he privilege" of the writ, but in any event, courts and commentators  have
assumed that an exercise of the suspension power does not itself bar a petitioner from
seeking habeas corpus and, at a minimum, obtaining  a determination  of whether  his
case  falls within  the  scope of the  suspension.  See  e.g.,  Ex parte Milligan,  71  U.S.  (4
Wall)  2,  130-31  (1866)  ("The suspension  of the privilege  of the writ of habeas copus
does  not suspend  the writ itself.  The writ  issues  as a matter  of course; and  on  the
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or  other  legal  rights  in  a  case  in which  it requires  dismissal  of the
petition?  Can  one  who  is  or has been  a detainee  still  maintain,  for
example,  that his detention is  (or was)  unconstitutional  or otherwise
unlawful, and that he has recourse  to other remedies, including dam-
ages  (now  or later),  declaratory  relief, and perhaps  even  injunctive
relief?
A.  Professor  Morrison's Thesis
In what is perhaps the first exhaustive  consideration  of this ques-
tion, Professor Trevor Morrison has contended that the answer to  the
general question is yes, though he is less clear on precisely what reme-
dies are or should be available  to the detainee. 90  But since I disagree
with his basic conclusion, I will try to summarize his arguments, and to
respond  to  them,  before  explaining why and  to  what  extent  I come
out on the other side.
At the  risk of oversimplification,  I submit the following  abridge-
ment of Morrison's  thesis, but  I  urge those who  seek a fuller under-
standing of his arguments  to  read his article  in full.
Morrison emphasizes what in some respects is his strongest point:
the writ of habeas corpus is itself a procedural remedy, not a substan-
tive  right.91  To analogize  the  civil wrong of breach  of contract,  the
remedy of specific performance may be unavailable in some instances,
but that does not abrogate  the contractual  right;  rather  it limits  the
available remedy  to (expectancy) damages.92  So  here, Morrison  con-
tends, the remedy of the writ  is  unavailable but underlying  rights re-
main intact and enforceable  by other means.93
Moreover,  the  distinction  is one recognized  in the  common law
history  of the writ and in at least one crucial decision of our own  Su-
preme  Court.  In  England, "[bly  themselves,  suspension  acts did not
insulate  the detaining authority  from  later-imposed  liability  [in dam-
ages]  for unlawful arrest and detention.  To  do that, Parliament typi-
cally accompanied  suspension acts  with acts  of indemnity."94  And  in
return made  to it the court decides whether the  party applying is denied the right of
proceeding  any further with it.").
90  See Morrison,  supra note  5,  at 416.
91  See,  e.g.,  id. at 427.
92  For discussion  of this concept in the contracts context, see  RESTATEMENT  (SEc-
OND)  OF  CONTRACTS  §  359(1)  (1981)  and  related commentary.
93  See Morrison,  supra note  5,  at 437.
94  Id. at 432  (citing  DUKER,  supra note  2,  at  171  n.118;  ROBERT J.  SHARPE,  THF
LAw  OF HABEAS  Coi,  us 95 (2d ed.  1989)).  Pfander also notes the availability of other
remedies as alternatives to habeas  corpus and cites  Wise v.  Withers, 7 U.S.  (3  Cranch)
331,  337  (1806),  as an example  of a case in which  the Supreme Court allowed a suit
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our own jurisprudence, the landmark decision  in Ex parte Milligan 95-
a decision rendered by a Court unanimous  as to the result but divided
on this very issue-lends further support to the proposition.96  In  Mil-
ligan, Morrison  notes, the  Court first concluded  that the Act of Con-
gress  suspending  the  writ did not in  terms  apply  in  Milligan's  case,
and then went on to hold  (a)  that Congress had not authorized Milli-
gan's  trial  by military  tribunal  in a jurisdiction  where the  civil courts
were open and available, and  (b)  that Congress in any event could not
have  done  so constitutionally  in  view of the  guarantees  that such  a
trial would violate.97  Four Justices  (who concurred in the result) spe-
cifically  disagreed on  (b),  contending  that the power  to suspend  car-
ried  with  it  the  power  to  arrest  and  to  try  the  prisoner  before  a
military  tribunal.98  And  in  the  course  of making  these  arguments,
Morrison also notes that the Suspension Clause is, after all, phrased as
a prohibition with exceptions,  and thus cannot reasonably  be read as
a delegation  of authority  to  Congress to modify or abrogate  any sub-
stantive  rights.99
In answer  to the possible  objection  that it makes little difference
whether, if the habeas remedy is unavailable, there are any underlying
rights,  Morrison notes  the possibility of alternative  remedies,  such  as
damages,  as well  as  the independently  restraining effect  of those un-
derlying  rights on  executive  abuse.' 00  And  in answer  to the  possible
objection  that  these  very responses  cast doubt  on  the  utility  of the
power to suspend, Morrison asserts that suspension serves to avoid the
burden of litigation in cases of lawful detentions, and to limit the con-
sequences  to  the  executive when  the detention  is  unlawful. 1 0'
for damages in trespass against the officer who took away the plaintiff's goods in order
to  enforce  a criminal fine  imposed by  a court-martial  that lacked jurisdiction  to try
and  convict  him.  See Pfander,  supra note  5,  at 500  n.13,  515,  525-37.  (Note  that
habeas  was  unavailable in  this case  not because  Congress had exercised  its authority
to suspend  the writ but because  the plaintiff was not in custody.)
95  71  U.S. (4 Wall.)  2  (1866).  In  this case, Milligan,  in his  petition for a writ of
habeas  corpus, challenged  the jurisdiction  of a  military tribunal  to try  an American
citizen,  living in  Indiana, for conspiring  to aid  the Confederacy.  Id. at 79-80.
96  Id. at  140.
97  Morrison,  supra note  5,  at 431  & n.121  (citing Milligan, 71  U.S. at  127).
98  Milligan, 71  U.S.  at 136-37  (opinion of Chase,  C.J.)  The ChiefJustice's  sepa-
rate opinion  is not characterized  in  the official report, except as an  opinion, and has
been variously characterized  by comentators.  In my view, as explained in the text, it is
a  concurrence  in  the judgment,  or  result,  but  not  in  all  of the  reasoning  of the
majority.
99  Morrison,  supra note 5,  at 431  & n.121.
100  Id. at 434-37.
101  Id. at  437-40.  In  the  course of his discussion,  Morrison  draws  an analogy  to
the famous distinction  drawn by Calabresi  and Melamed  between property  rules  and
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Morrison  concludes  by  urging that perhaps  the  most important
purpose served by his analysis is to preserve some role for the judiciary
even in times of crisis, and even when Congress has exercised properly
its authority to suspend the writ-a role that is critical  to the preserva-
tion of our system  of separation and allocation of powers.10 2
B.  Response
Each of Morrison's  principal historical arguments-that based on
the English experience and that based on Ex parte Milligan-is  vulner-
able and, in the end, not persuasive.  First, although the English expe-
rience is admittedly relevant to our understanding of the writ, there is
a critical  difference  between  the context of that experience  and our
own.  Though Parliament did not operate free from constraints, those
constraints were essentially imposed by custom and not by law.  Given
the concept of Parliamentary supremacy,  and the  unavailability of ju-
dicial review  of the validity of statutes,  the legislature  was legally free
to suspend the writ whenever it chose to do so, and if it also wished to
make sure that no other remedy  lay for detention pursuant to such a
suspension of the writ (as Morrison  acknowledges  it routinely did'03),
such legislative  action also was subject to no legal  restraint.  Here,  as
Morrison and most observers agree, the availability  of the writ is con-
stitutionally  guaranteed,  subject  only  to  narrow  and  explicit  excep-
tions.  (And of course, we also have  other constitutional  restraints on
the ability of the legislature  to abridge  certain  rights.)
liability  rules.  Id. at 439 n.150  (citing  Guido Calabresi  & A.  Douglas  Melamed,  Prop-
erty Rules, Liability Rules,  and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,  85  HARv.  L.  Rvv.
1089  (1972)).  The authors  of that article  note that  the availability  of an  injunctive
remedy gives  the property  owner a right that is  legally immunized from interference
(and thus constitutes a "property rule"),  Calabresi & Melamed,  supra at 1092,  while a
damages  remedy  gives  the owner only legal  recourse to monetary  compensation  for
harm  resulting from the interference  (and  is thus  a  "liability rule"),  id. The  habeas
remedy,  Morrison  suggests,  "is  closer  to  a property  rule  than  [to]  a liability  rule."
Morrison,  supra note 5,  at 439  n.150.
102  Morrison argues that his approach, like that ofJustice O'Connor  (speaking for
a plurality in  Hamdi v.  Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.  507  (2004)),  has the virtue of allowing con-
gressional  authorization  and judicial  review  to coexist,  thus preserving  a role for  all
three branches in a time of national crisis.  Morrison,  supra  note 5,  at 448-51.  (Justice
O'Connor, in  Hamdi, concluded that Congress's authorization  of detention  without
trial  of U.S.  citizens deemed  to  be enemy  combatants  did not preclude judicial  in-
quiry into  such basic  constitutional  issues  as the  adequacy  of the  processes used  to
determine  whether  a detainee  is in  fact an  enemy  combatant.  Hamdi, 542  U.S.  at
524-39 (O'ConnorJ., plurality opinion).  Of course,  as she noted, Congress had not
taken any action  to suspend  the  habeas writ.  Id. at 536-37.)
103  Morrison,  supra note 5,  at 432-33.
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One might view the existence  (even if implied) of a constitutional
guarantee  as  suggesting  that  suspension  of the  writ should,  if any-
thing, result in less disruption to individual liberty than if the implied
guarantee were  lacking.  But I  see  the guarantee,  when coupled  with
the explicit power to suspend, as cutting quite differently-as support-
ing the conclusion that the presence of the specified justifications  for
a  valid  suspension  of  the  writ  has  more far-reaching  consequences
under our law  than  did  an  analogous  suspension  in  England  by  an
unfettered  legislature.' 0 4  Moreover,  though in theory other remedies
may have been  available for "unlawful" detention  on those occasions
when Parliament suspended  the availability  of the writ, I know of no
actual  case in which  a plaintiff was awarded  such a remedy.1 0 5
Second,  Morrison's  reliance  on  Milligan rests,  in  my  view,  on  a
misunderstanding  of the rationale  of the  majority  and  the disagree-
ment of four Justices who concurred in the result.  As Morrison  notes,
the Court did not consider the merits of Milligan's claim in his habeas
petition until it determined  that the Act suspending the writ did not
apply  to  his case. 1 0 6  It then  went on  to  hold that  Congress did  not,
and  constitutionally  could  not, authorize  Milligan's  trial  by  military
tribunal on the admitted facts of his case.10 7  That the disagreement of
four Justices  with  the  majority  went essentially  to  the  latter  point  is
made  clear  in  their  opinion  itself,  which  expressed  the  view  that
"there are  cases in which,  the privilege of the  writ being suspended,
trial  and  punishment  by  military  commission,  in  states  where  civil
courts are open, may be authorized  by Congress, as well as arrest and
detention." 08
Thus no Justice on the Court said or implied that, despite the Act
of suspension, detentions covered  by its terms could be held unlawful.
104  As  Morrison  notes,  discussion  at the Constitutional  Convention  evidently did
not touch on the question whether a suspension would  constitute affirmative authori-
zation of detention that would otherwise be unlawful.  Id. at 433 n.131.  But the impli-
cations of that fact are surely limited.  Compare the implications of the Convention's
relative silence  on  the question  whether  explicit authorization  of suspension  of the
writ constituted  tacit recognition  that absent the conditions requisite  to  suspension,
the privilege  of the writ was affirmatively  guaranteed  as  a matter of federal  law.  On
that question,  see  supra discussion  Part I.D.
105  Interestingly, Collings states that when Parliament enacted a suspension of the
writ in England, causing the Habeas Corpus Act to cease  to operate,  the result was  to
"allow[ I confinement without  bail, indictment, or other judicial process."  Collings,
supra note 6,  at 340.
106  Morrison,  supra note  5, at  431  (citing  Ex parte Milligan,  71  U.S.  (4  Wall.)  2,
130-31  (1866)).
107  Id. (citing  Milligan, 71  U.S.  at 106-07,  130-31).
108  Milligan, 71  U.S.  (4 Wall.)  2,  137  (1866)  (opinion of Chase, CJ.).
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The  disagreement was whether  there were  circumstances  in which  a
valid suspension could be accompanied by a valid authorization  to try
a detainee  before  a  military  commission.  Yet Morrison's  thesis,  and
the conclusion with which I  disagree,  is that a valid suspension  does
not render the  detention itself beyond  legal challenge.
In  the  only somewhat  puzzling  aspect  of  Milligan on  this  ques-
tion, four Justices also  express disagreement with  the majority  on the
issue of whether "when the writ is suspended, the Executive is author-
ized  to  arrest  as  well  as  to  detain." 10 9  (Note  the  implication  in this
quote that suspension implies authority "to detain".)  While detention
without trial  is not only conceivable  but was in fact condoned in the
particular  circumstances  presented in  the  important recent  decision
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,11  it is hard to see how detention can occur with-
out some form of physical seizure or arrest, unless the detainee volun-
tarily  walks into  custody.  But  a full  reading  of the  lengthy  Milligan
opinions reveals that the essential concern of both related to the ques-
tion of trial, not to the arrest." 1 I  And in any event, no member of the
Court  suggested  that, if a  valid  Act of Congress  suspending  the  writ
had been applicable in Milligan's case, the detention itself would have
been unconstitutional  or otherwise  unlawful.
Though  I  will  develop the point more  fully in the following sec-
tion, Part II.C, a few words are appropriate here in response  to Morri-
son's  basic  argument-that  the  writ  is  but  a  remedy,  and  the
unavailability of a remedy does not affect the existence of the underly-
ing  right.' 12  Of course,  Morrison  recognizes-in  his  analogy  to  the
powerful  distinction between  property rules  and liability rules  drawn
109  Id.
110  See 542 U.S. at 516-24 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).  For a brief statement
of Justice O'Connor's conclusions  in  Hamdi, see  supra note  102.
111  See, e.g.,  Milligan, 71  U.S. at 118  (stating that the "controlling question  in  the
case"  was  one  of "jurisdiction"); id. at  132  (opinion of Chase,  C.J.)  (acknowledging
that the  issue was  one of jurisdiction).
112  In  Hamdi, Justice  Thomas,  the  only Justice  addressing  this  issue,  evidently
agreed with  Morrison:
I do not see  how suspension  would make constitutional  otherwise unconsti-
tutional  detentions ordered  by the President.  It simply  removes  a  remedy.
Justice Scalia's position  might therefore require one or both of the political
branches  to  act unconstitutionally  in order  to  protect the Nation.  But the
power  to protect the Nation must be the power  to do so  lawfully.
Hamdi, 542  U.S.  at 594  (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Note that Justice Thomas uses this
point  to  argue  in  favor of inherent executive  branch  authority  to  detain  indepen-
dently of any implicit authorization accompanying  a valid suspension of the writ, and
whether or not the conditions for suspension exist.  Id. at 580-94.  This is a position I
reject, and  I'm sure Morrison  does too.
2006]86  NO  DAKit  I  REVIEW  *  . .
by  Calabresi  and  Melamed-that  the  character  of the  right  is  pro-
foundly affected by the nature of the available remedy.
1 3  But he does
not consider Professor  Daryl Levinson's later and fuller development
of the  relationship between right and remedy in his important article
on the subject written  in  1999.114  Levinson  argues that the  relation-
ship is  in many ways  so  close that "the  cash  value  of a right  is often
nothing  more than  what  the courts  (or  some  other  institution  with
enforcement  authority, for example,  Congress)  will do if the right is
violated."
115  Though  I  do not fully endorse  his thesis,  to the  extent
that it challenges  the right-remedy  distinction  across  the board, I be-
lieve it highlights  a relationship  that has  always  been  intuitively  per-
ceived  if  not  fully  articulated.  In  light  of  that  relationship,  the
challenge  is  to  arrive  at  the  best  interpretation  of  the  Suspension
Clause,  and  the  particular  remedy  it  allows  Congress  to withdraw,
from  the standpoint of the purpose  of the Framers,  the needs of the
government  in  times of crisis,  and the process of law that is due the
individual in such times.  In other words, to what extent does the valid
suspension of what  is, and for centuries has been, the principal rem-
edy for a particular  abuse of power affect the very definition of what
constitutes  abuse?
C.  Detention Within the Scope of a Valid Suspension Is Not  Unlawful
As already noted, the case for an implicit constitutional guarantee
of the  availability  of the habeas  remedy is a  strong one,  and one  ac-
cepted by most commentators as well as by the Supreme Court itself in
powerful  dictum  in  St.  Cyr.'
1 6  Is there  also  a strong case  for an  im-
plicit withdrawal of any objection, under the Constitution or any other
provision  of our law,  to  the  lawfulness  of a  detention  pursuant  to a
valid suspension of the habeas  remedy?
I  believe  that there  is,  and that the  case is a convincing  one.  Its
principal  support  lies  in  the  natural  understanding  of  those  who
framed the Suspension Clause and of the kinds of conditions likely to
exist when  its  use  is warranted.
On the first of these  grounds, the contemporary  view of the writ
was  not only  as  the first line of defense  against  unlawful  detention,
113  Morrison,  supra note  5,  at 438-39  (citing  Calabresi  & Melamed,  supra note
101).
114  Daryl J.  Levinson,  Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,  99  COLUM.  L.
REV.  857  (1999).
115  Id. at 887.
116  INS v.  St. Cyr,  533 U.S. 289, 300-01  (2001);  see supra text accompanying  notes
41-43.
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but, I  believe,  more substantively,  as  the  means  by which  individual
freedom from arbitrary detention  was to be guaranteed.  Blackstone's
emphasis on the link between the substantive commitments of compli-
ance  with  law  in  the  Magna  Carta and  the  remedy  supplied  by the
Great Writ1 17 is hard to exaggerate.' 1 8  As  he said in the introduction
to an extended discussion, the function  of "the most celebrated writ in
the English  law"' 19 is to require  that a reason be given for every com-
mitment, so that "the court upon a  habeas corpus may examine into its
validity; and according to the circumstances of the case may discharge,
admit  to bail,  or remand" the  prisoner.12 0  Moreover,  he  noted, on
those  occasions  when  evasion  of the  writ threatened  its  critical  role,
the legislature  had acted  to  restore  the balance. 12'
Thus  it  seems  more  than  likely  that  contemporary  thinking
tended to equate the right to be free from unlawful detention with the
role of habeas  corpus  in  guaranteeing  that right.  And  this  belief is
buttressed  by the nature of the debate over the appropriate  language
to  use  in  the  Constitution-a  debate  that  focused  primarily  on
whether or not any exceptions to the availability of the writ should be
recognized.122  The intensity of this debate makes far less  sense if the
availability  of the writ and  the  lawfulness  of the  detention  were  not
regarded  as  two sides  of the  same coin.
The  history of suspension  by federal  legislative  act supports  this
understanding.  Such  legislation  has  been  rare and  has  been  essen-
tially confined  to those circumstances  in which  the dangers of chaos
and lawlessness  were so great as to warrant emergency measures  tanta-
mount to martial law. 12 3  The notions  that detentions under such cir-
117  BLACISTONE,  supra note  11,  at *133-34.
118  See supra note  18  and accompanying  text.
119  BLACKSTONE,  supra note  11,  at *129.
120  Id. at *134  (emphasis  omitted).  To be  sure,  Blackstone  also  referred  quite
briefly  to several  alternatives  as remedies  for "false  imprisonment."  See  id. at *128,
*138.  But  each of the  three  rather archaic  writs  referred  to  (writs  of "mainprize,"
"odio  et  atia," and  "de  homine replegiando")  was  of extremely  limited  value.  See  id. at
*128-29.  And in his one paragraph  (one sentence)  discussion of an action  in trespass
for damages resulting from false  imprisonment, id. at *138, he makes no reference to
detention  pursuant to the order of a government official, or to the question  of when
such  detention  may lead  to liability in damages.
121  Id. at *134-38.
122  See  DUKER,  supra note  2,  at  128-31  (noting that  one  point  of concern  ex-
pressed at the Convention with respect to the Suspension  Clause-perhaps the princi-
pal point-was that since the powerto  suspend already existed in the states (or most
of them),  it was unnecessary  and dangerous  to give  that power to  Congress  as well).
123  Congress has  authorized  suspension infrequently-during  the Civil War  (after
the President's unilateral suspension  of the writ); during Reconstruction;  in  the Phil-
ippines in the early  twentieth century in the event of "rebellion,  insurrection, or inva-
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cumstances  might  be  subject  to  other  remedies,  either
contemporaneous  or ex post, and that  (as Morrison  argues)  the exec-
utive might be restrained  from ordering a detention he deems neces-
sary to preserve  or restore  order by the  threat of such sanctions-or
even  by the moral force  of his  oath  to support the  Constitution  and
laws' 24-simply  cannot  be reconciled  with  the underlying premise  of
the  legislative decision.  In  this very  practical sense then, remedy and
right become not just interdependent but inseparable.
Interestingly,  Morrison appears to  recognize this point in a foot-
note discussing the possibility of obtaining an injunctive decree order-
ing release  during  a period  of valid suspension.1 25  In  rejecting  this
possibility, he simply notes that under existing doctrine, an injunction
may not be an  available  remedy  for state prisoners,  that it is  in  any
event a  remedy that may be denied  in the  "sound discretion"  of the
trial judge, and that Congress  could seal  any loophole by prohibiting
its use  as  an alternative  to  the writ in instances  in which the writ has
been  suspended. 126   Nowhere  does  he  consider  the  question
whether-accepting  his assumption that the detention may be uncon-
stitutional  even  though  the  writ has been  suspended-the  Constitu-
tion  itself may require that some meaningful  remedy be available.1 27
Moreover,  Morrison's  first reason for questioning  the availability
of injunctive relief cuts deeper than he appears  to recognize.  In a line
of cases beginning with  Preiser  v. Rodriguez,12 8 the Court has  held that
the  existence of the habeas corpus  remedy for one in custody  pursu-
ant to  a state conviction bars resort not only to  the  alternative  of in-
sion"  (a  power  exercised  by  the  governor  in  1905  with  respect  to  a  particular
province, during a  period of insurrection in  that province); and  in Hawaii under the
Organic Act  of 1900,  when  required  by the "public safety"  (a power exercised  by the
governor  after the attack  on  Pearl  Harbor in  1941).  See Ekeland,  supra note  48,  at
1487 & nn.83-87.
For a full discussion  of one  compelling  example of the need for such  authoriza-
tion and the use of delegated authority, see Lou Falkner Williams,  The Constitution and
the Ku  Klux Klan  on  Trial. Federal Enforcement and Local Resistance in South  Carolina,
1871-1872, 2  GA.J. S.  LEGAL  HIsT.  41  (1993),  describing  the virtual overrunning  of
South Carolina by the Ku Klux Klan  after the Civil War and the resulting  mass arrests
and detentions  by government forces,  acting pursuant to legislatively  authorized sus-
pension  of the  writ under the Ku  Klux  Klan Act, ch.  22,  § 4,  17  Stat. 13,  14.
124  Morrison,  supra note  5, at 435-36.
125  Id. at 433 n.134.
126  Id.
127  For discussion of  the  complex issues presented  by  the questions  of whether,
when,  and to  what extent  the  Constitution  itself  may mandate  the  availability  of at
least one meaningful remedy for invasion,  or threatened  invasion, of a constitutional
right, see  HART  &  WECHSLER,  supra note  10, at 795-804,  823-25.
128  411  U.S. 475  (1973).
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junctive relief in a civil rights action but also to a civil rights action for
damages where  the judgment  in  either case  would  in  effect require
invalidation  of the  conviction on which  the  commitment  rests.
29  By
implication,  if the rigorous hurdles that a habeas applicant must sur-
mount operate to bar that habeas remedy for the state prisoner, those
hurdles cannot  be  circumvented by  resort to these  other avenues  of
relief.
1 3 0  To be  sure,  this line  of cases  is  not directly on  point in  a
situation in which  the prisoner  is complaining  not of state detention
pursuant to  a  state judgment but rather  of federal  executive  deten-
tion.  But the  cases  are  surely  relevant  by  analogy.  If Congress  has
made  a valid  decision  that extreme  circumstances  warrant  denial  of
the classic  remedy for one officially detained, should the detainee be
able to  circumvent  that decision  by resorting  to another remedy that
Congress has inadvertently failed to withdraw?  (Or if some meaning-
ful  remedy must be  available for  violations  of individual  rights,  one
that Congress could not withdraw?)  Or is the sounder conclusion that
the legislature's  decision to make this classic remedy unavailable-by
exercising  its power under  the Suspension  Clause-frees  the Execu-
tive  from  the  legal  restraints  on  detention  that  would  otherwise
apply?131
129  Id. at 489-91.  The most significant  of the later cases is  Heck v.  Humphrey, 512
U.S.  477  (1994).
130  Among  the  most important hurdles  that a habeas  petitioner  must surmount
are the  requirement  of exhaustion  of state  remedies,  see 28  U.S.C.  § 2254(b) (1) (A)
(2000),  and a one-year  statute of limitations,  see id. § 2244(d) (1).  The Court has yet
to determine whether the  Preiserline of cases bars remedies other than habeas for one
who was convicted but not imprisonec  (and thus was never eligible for habeas  relief),
or who was  imprisoned but who  since has been unconditionally  released  (and thus is
no longer eligible for habeas relief).  See Muhammad  v.  Close, 540  U.S.  749,  752 n.2
(2004).  (In neither  case,  of course,  is the habeas  remedy  unavailable  because  of a
valid  suspension  of the writ.)
131  1 believe  that Pfander asks  a different question-whether  the unavailability  of
the writ for reasons not involving a valid suspension precludes the use of other reme-
dies, and concludes that it does not.  Pfander,  supra  note 5, at 525-26.  (He gives as an
example  a case  in which  the writ is  unavailable because  the relevant statute  does not
confer territorial jurisdiction  on American  courts to grant habeas relief to a petitioner
detained beyond our borders.  See id. at 525.)  To the extent that such a withdrawal  of
jurisdiction  is not based on  premises that warrant, and render  constitutionally valid,
the  denial of any judicial remedy  to  a petitioner,  I agree  with this conclusion.  But I
view the exercise of the power  to suspend as significantly different.  (Indeed the sensi-
ble  rule, articulated  by the Court in  United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,  205 (1952),
that an adequate  alternative  defeats  a Suspension  Clause claim  itself suggests  that a
valid suspension  defeats  the argument for an alternative  remedy.)
Similarly, the thesis advanced  by Kontorovich-that  in the context  of a mass de-
tention,  the federal  courts  may find  it  appropriate  to  allow  an  ex post  (damages)
remedy but not an injunctive one-assumes that there  has not been a  legislative  sus-[VOL.  82:1 NOTRE  DAME  LAW  REVIEW
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Consider again  for a moment the  practical consequences  of the
opposite  view.  Congress  has  determined  that emergency  conditions
justify extraordinary  action,  in  particular, permitting  detentions  that
would otherwise  be  subject  to  challenge  in  habeas  corpus  proceed-
ings.  Nevertheless,  the  executive,  or  those  exercising  delegated  au-
thority under him, might well be deterred  from engaging in the very
activity needed, and contemplated, to deal with the crisis by threats of
financial  liability or by an understandable  reluctance  to violate  their
oaths  to  support  the Constitution  and  laws.  Wouldn't the  very  pur-
pose of the suspension  be undermined,  if not nullified?
Another  consequence  of the  opposite  view  is brought  home  by
Justice  Thomas's  dissent  in  the  Hamdi case. 132  Acceptance  of that
view led him to the conclusion  that suspension of a mere  remedy was
not sufficient to  meet the needs created by a crisis because it did not
in itself validate  a  decision  to detain.)
33  Thus, he argued, regardless
of whether or not Congress exercised its power under the Suspension
Clause, the Executive  had unreviewable authority to determine that a
person  (whether or  not a  citizen)  was  an  enemy  combatant  and  to
detain  the person  on that basis without further process.'
34
D.  The Sky  Will Not Fall
The skeptical  reader  may well object  that  this  understanding  of
the  Suspension  Clause  thwarts  its function by taking  away from  indi-
viduals more than it gives-that a provision whose purpose  is to guar-
antee  a  meaningful  remedy  for  those  unlawfully  detained  is  being
read  to undercut other constitutional and statutory guarantees.  In at
least partial response  to this concern,  I  will try  to explain the  limited
(but still important)  scope  of the argument presented  here.
First, the result advocated here does give significance to the disa-
greement at the time of drafting and ratification  between  those who
would allow no suspension and those who would allow it during times
of crisis,  and only during  such times.  If the  debate were  only about
the availability  of one remedy among several, its intensity is harder to
pension  of  the  writ.  Kontorovich,  Liability Rules,  supra note  5,  at  759.  Indeed,
Kontorovich  expressly  states  that  his  proposal  "would not  require  a suspension  of
habeas  corpus."  Id. at 792  n.l1
9 . This  footnote  may  imply that a damages  remedy
would still  be available  if the writ were suspended, but the  issue is  not discussed.
132  Hamdi  v.  Rumsfeld,  542  U.S.  507,  579  (2004)  (Thomas, J.,  dissenting);  see
supra note  112.
133  Pfander,  supra note 5,  at 594.
134  Hamdi, 542  U.S. at 579  (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Nor was  this authority  lim-
ited, in his view, to the need to take emergency action until Congress had an opportu-
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grasp.  But if the debate is understood as involving the ability to detain
free from any judicial oversight during times of crisis, its importance is
more readily understood.
Second,  the judicial  role  in overseeing  acts of suspension  has al-
ready  been  recognized  in  several  cases,  most  notably  Ex parte Milli-
gan,1 35  where  the  Court  concluded  that  Milligan  himself  was  not
within  the  scope  of the  legislative  provision  for  suspension  of  the
writ . 3 6  Moreover,  as advocated  here and more  forcefully  by  others,
the very validity of a  suspension-with  respect to both the  predicate
conditions  and  the  duration  and  other  terms  of the  suspension-
should be subject to judicial review,  though  the standard of review is
far from certain. 137  These aspects of judicial supervision serve to limit
the impact on individual  liberty of a valid suspension and help  to en-
sure that conditions really do warrant the authority  that a suspension
vests  in the executive  branch.
Finally, and perhaps most important, acceptance  of the argument
made here should not be understood to mean more than  this:  if the
detaining  authority is acting pursuant to a valid legislative suspension
of the writ, only the  detention itself-and actions  (such as seizure  of
the person)  that are strictly necessary to effectuate it-are immunized
from  the  restraints that would  otherwise  apply  under  the governing
law.  Thus the invocation of remedies other than habeas corpus would
be available, for example, in connection with a claim for maltreatment
in  violation  of  law,  treaty,  or  the  Constitution;1 3   as  a  means  of
preventing trial by a tribunal not duly authorized by law to adjudicate
135  71  U.S. (4 Wall,)  2  (1866).
136  Id  at 130-31.
137  See supra Part I.E,
138  Claims of improper treatment during detention  might range from  allegations
of physical  abuse  to denial  of access to  counsel, and the validity of any such  claims
would depend on factors independent of the authority conferred by legislation  pursu-
ant to  the  Suspension  Clause.  For example, a prisoner  might complain  (if in state
detention,  under 42 U.S.C.  § 1983,  or if in federal  detention, under  Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908),  and/or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U..  388 (1971))
of treatment allegedly in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  If successful,  he might
be entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to the treatment, or to dam-
ages for the  harm caused  by  it, but not to release  from detention.
Moreover, in circumstances akin to those described by Kontorovich, where courts
were inundated with complaints of maltreatment in connection  with  mass detentions
resulting from a national  emergency, the courts, with or without legislative authoriza-
tion, and quite apart from the suspension of the habeas writ, might properly choose
to restrict  the  remedies  available  to  ex  post relief (e.g.,  a  Bivens damages  remedy).
Kontorovich,  Liability Rules,  supra note  5,  at 781-82.
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the offense charged;
139  or in order to obtain review of a conviction.
14 0
Success on any such claim would entail relief from the official conduct
in question, including invalidation of a conviction,  but would not re-
quire or permit the cessation  of continued detention as authorized by
a valid suspension of the writ.
My reasoning here centers on the classic function  of the writ as it
was  understood when  the Suspension  Clause was adopted.  Although
the scope of the writ has expanded to allow its use to raise such claims
as the lawfulness of treatment and to assert the unlawfulness of limita-
tions on freedom of movement that fall well short of true  detention,
and the  writ  has  long been  available  to  question  the  authority  of a
tribunal  seeking  to  exercise  adjudicatory  authority,  the  focus  of the
writ has traditionally been on the fact of detention
.141  Thus, I believe,
there is  no inconsistency  between  the  unavailability  of a  remedy for
139  For example, such relief could be sought by a petition for a writ of mandamus
or prohibition, or as suggested  supra note 94, might in some circumstances be limited
to  ex post  relief of  the  type  recognized  in  Wise v.  Withers, 7  U.S.  (3  Cranch)  331
(1806).  See generally Pfander,  supra note  5,  at  525-37  (discussing  "nonstatutory"
review).
140  Remedies  for unlawful conviction  other than habeas corpus  include direct re-
view  (on appeal)  and the writ of coram nobis.  The Supreme  Court  has several  times
indicated that there is no constitutional  right to direct appeal-see, for example,  Mc-
Kane v. Durston, 153 U.S.  684, 688-89  (1894).  But-as noted in  CHARLES  H. WHITE-
BREAD  &  CHRISTOPHER  SLOBOGIN,  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE  §  29.01,  at  810-11  (4th  ed.
2000)-the  constitutional  status  of denial  of all  review  of a criminal  conviction  has
never been  squarely addressed, and in view of the general  availability of appeal as  of
right, probably  never will  be.  With  respect to  the  use of the  writ of  coram nobis to
challenge the lawfulness of a conviction, see, for example,  United States v.  Morgan, 346
U.S.  502,  505-06  (1954);  Hirabayashi v.  United States, 828  F.2d  591,  594  (9th Cir.
1987).
141  An  important decision  bearing  on  this  argument  is  Wilkinson  v.  Dotson, 544
U.S.  74  (2005).  In  that case,  prisoners,  in  actions brought  under 42  U.S.C.  §  1983,
challenged  the  validity  of parole  proceedings  on  grounds  that, if successful,  would
result not in release  but only  in new parole  hearings.  Id. at 76-77.  The Court held
the  Preiser line  of cases,  see supra note  128  and accompanying  text, inapplicable  to
preclude  action under §  1983  because  the proceedings  at bar  (even  if they could be
brought as petitions for habeas corpus) did  not go the "core" of the habeas remedy:
the  relief sought did  not include  a request for  immediate  or speedier  release,  nor
would success "necessarily  imply" the invalidity of the convictions on which the deten-
tions were based.  Wilkinson, 544  U.S. at 81.  The case  is relevant here because  it un-
derscores  the  fact that  the  modern  habeas  remedy  has  expanded  well  beyond  the
"core" to which I believe the Suspension  Clause refers.  As for the Court's reference to
the use of a habeas proceeding to establish the invalidity of a conviction, I believe  that
this  use  only  goes  to  the  core  of the  remedy  when  the  detention  itself  cannot be
legally defended on any other ground.  And if a valid legislative suspension of the writ
authorizes any detention within its scope, whether or not the detainee has been tried
and convicted, that condition is not met.  (Nor would it be met in such circumstances
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detention and a challenge  to maltreatment that, if successful,  does not
result in discharge of the prisoner.  Nor, in my view, is there any con-
flict between  the writ's unavailability  and an  action to prevent a trial,
or to attack a conviction-so long as the success of the action does not
require termination  of the detention.  (Of course,  success  of the  ac-
tion  may persuade  the  authorities  to terminate  the detention,  but if
they conclude that detention is still warranted  pursuant to a valid sus-
pension of the writ, no present or ex post remedy would be available,
and indeed, no law would be  violated.)
The  remedial-substantive  link,  in  sum,  does  not mean  that  the
function of the writ is to protect all elements of the due process guar-
antee, either as  that guarantee  was  originally  envisioned or as  it has
evolved over the centuries.  Rather, in both its inception and its devel-
opment  (though  recent years have seen some significant expansion),
the writ was understood  as the method of challenging  the  lawfulness
of detention.1 42  Thus, in my view, it was that particular aspect, and only
that aspect,  of due  process  that  the  Founders  were  willing  to  allow
Congress  to abridge  during times of crisis.
True, the possibility remains that Congress, in an effort to cut off
judicial consideration of other claims  of unlawful  conduct, might also
enact legislation-perhaps in the form ofjurisdiction-stripping-seek-
ing to bar such  claims from being  brought to any  court in  any form.
But any such legislation would raise difficult questions alluded to ear-
lier' 43  and  would  receive  little or  no  support from  the  authority  of
Congress  to suspend the writ.
Three  testing  cases  may  help to illustrate both the  core and  the
limitations  of my argument.  First, the  decision  to  intern  Japanese-
Americans during World  War II-perhaps  one  of the most criticized
by a challenge to the jurisdiction of a tribunal set up to adjudicate a criminal  charge
against the detainee.)
142  The  significance  of detention  (or imprisonment  or custody)  as both  the  basis
of jurisdiction  and  the question  at issue  on  a  petition  for habeas  corpus  has  been
stressed  throughout  this Article.  It is  evident not only  in  the jurisdictional  require-
ment that the petitioner be in  custody but in the analysis of the writ in  the writings of
Blackstone,  see supra note  120, and other jurists and commentators,  see, for example,
Clarke  D. Forsythe,  The Historical  Origins of Broad  Federal  Habeas Corpus Review Reconsid-
ered, 70  NOTRE  DAME  L.  REv.  1079,  1087  (1995)  (describing  the  writ  as  requiring  a
showing of "sufficient legal  cause for detaining or jailing"),  as well as in manyjudicial
opinions,  see,  for example,  Fay v.  Noia, 372 U.S.  391,  430  (1963)  (referring  to  the
jurisdictional  prerequisite for habeas  as "detention  simpliciter'); In re Medley, 134  U.S.
160,  173  (1890)  (noting that traditionally, habeas  corpus is  a remedy only for wrong-
ful commitment and that the traditional  form of relief has therefore been  discharge
from prison).
143  See supra note  127  and accompanying  text.
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events  in our history-would  almost  certainly gain  no support from
my argument. 144  Not only was there no legislation that could be read
as suspending the writ in that context,145  but had there been, it might
well have been vulnerable  to challenge  on the ground that, although
we  were at war, there was no "rebellion" or "invasion" warranting sus-
pension  of the writ  on our own  West  Coast.  (Even  if the  attack  on,
and occupation  of, American soil thousands  of miles from  California
constituted an "invasion," the distance  from California and  the enor-
mous sweep  of the dragnet, based solely on ethnicity, might well have
been regarded as an abuse of the discretion  conferred  by the "public
safety"  provision  of  the  Suspension  Clause.)  The  "relocation,"  in
other words, highlights the kind of emergency that must be present to
warrant  invocation of this emergency  power.
Milligan's  case  is  a  second  example.  Though  Indiana  itself was
not part of the Confederacy,  there  clearly was a "rebellion," and  the
rebelling states were not far away.' 4 6  Thus it is distinctly possible that
had Congress suspended the writ in terms applicable  to Milligan,  the
suspension  would  have  withstood judicial  review.  But,  as  suggested
above,  that would not have  barred Milligan  from bringing an appro-
priate action  (for a writ of prohibition or mandamus)  to  prevent his
trial  by  a  military  commission.' 47  Had  Milligan  succeeded,  no  trial
could  have occurred, but the Executive would still have  had authority
to  detain  him, so  long as the  detention  continued  to fall  within the
terms  of a valid Act suspending  the writ.
Finally, take a case like Hamdi's. 1 4 8  If we assume that the present
crisis  warrants  a legislative  decision  to  suspend  the  writ,149  and  that
144  Of the  three significant Japanese-American  interment  cases  in  the Supreme
Court, two  (Korematsu v.  United States, 323  U.S.  214  (1945),  and  Hirabyashi  v.  United
States, 320 U.S.  81  (1943))  arose on direct review, and affirmed the petitioners'  crimi-
nal convictions.  Only  the third,  Ex parte Endo, 323  U.S.  283  (1944),  discussed  infra
note  145,  involved  a habeas  corpus petition.
There  have been  many studies  of the internment of Japanese-Americans  during
World War  II.  For one  of particular  contemporary interest,  because  of its  effort to
relate  that  experience  to the  current  internment  of persons  deemed to  be  enemy
combatants, see Jerry Kang,  Watching the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the Internment's
Shadow, LAw  & CONTEMP.  PROBS.,  Spring 2005,  at 255, at 264-78.
145  In  Ex parte Endo, the Supreme Court held that a writ of habeas corpus  should
be granted to the petitioner, a loyal citizen ofJapanese  descent who was being held in
a relocation center.  Endo, 323 U.S. at 305-06.  No argument was made by the Govern-
ment in this  case that there was  any applicable Act of Congress  suspending the writ.
146  Ex parte Milligan,  71  U.S.  (4  Wall)  2,  140  (1866).
147  See supra notes  138-41  and accompanying  text.
148  Hamdi v.  Rumsfeld,  542 U.S.  507  (2004);  see supra note  102.
149  As advocated  in Ekeland,  supra note 48, at 1517-19.
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Congress  were  to  enact  such  legislation,  the  question  whether
Hamdi's detention came within the terms of the legislation would still
be open to judicial challenge  (for example, the Act might well be lim-
ited to "enemy combatants"),  as would such questions as the nature of
his treatment  and the authority  of a particular  tribunal  to adjudicate
any charges  against him.1 50
CONCLUSION
Accommodation  between  the  demands  of national  security  and
those of the individual  to be free from abusive interference, especially
with his  physical liberty,  is never  easy.  And for one  who  is loath  to
sacrifice  the  latter  under any  circumstances,  the  task is  particularly
agonizing.  But  the resolution  suggested  here is,  I  believe,  the  most
consistent with  the  text, purpose,  and understanding  of the  Suspen-
sion  Clause; with  the  emergencies  that warrant  its  use;  and with  the
individual interests that require protection, even  in the midst of a na-
tional crisis.
150  If, as is likely,  any Act suspending the writ would be  limited to enemy  combat-
ants, or persons  meeting a similar description,  a court on  a habeas petition would be
entitled  to  consider  the  question  of  the  detainee's  status  in  order  to  determine
whether the Act applied under  its own  terms.  This approximates  the actual  result in
the case.
2oo6]96  NOTRE  DAME  LAW  REVIEW  (VOL.  82:1